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Chapter 1: 
Introduction and summary 

31. Introduction1
This dissertation addresses the private–public mix within the Norwegian specialised 
healthcare system and the labour supply of medical specialists affiliated with the 
private and public sectors. Although the Norwegian healthcare system serves as a 
typical example of a Scandinavian welfare state model, based on public funding and 
ownership of the hospitals, the turn of the millennium introduced a significant private 
element into the supply structure. As the private supply of healthcare services over the 
years has increased, however, it is becoming increasingly puzzling that the 
comprehensive political debate over private versus public healthcare provision has not 
been accompanied by a corresponding increase in research on the topic. Hence, this 
dissertation aspires to add new knowledge about the private supply side of specialised 
healthcare by describing and explaining the private–public mix and comparing the 
vocational choices, decisions and behaviours of medical specialists with different 
sector affiliations. The aim of the thesis is three-fold: first, to describe the increase in, 
and geographical distribution of, private suppliers of specialised healthcare; second, to 
explain physicians’ choices of work between the private and the public sector; and, 
third, to account for physicians’ supply of labour both across and within the sectors. 
During the past decade, the Nordic welfare model has been under pressure (e.g., 
Kuhnle, 2000), and as emphasised by, e.g., Christensen & Lægreid (2003), there has 
been a growing awareness about other possible welfare providers besides the public 
sector. In particular, there has been an increased focus on market competition and the 
private sector’s potential to provide efficient service. The most immediate causes of 
this change in focus have been the increasing financial burden on governments, a wish 
to reduce the size and complexity of government, a desire for improved efficiency and 
a call for more freedom of choice for the users/consumers. The changes that have 
taken place, and which have partially taken the form of reforms of the entire service 
delivery systems, have commonly been termed New Public Management (NPM) 
reforms. Shared features of these reforms are the emphasis on increased competition, 
privatisation and consumer orientation (e.g., Hood, 1991; Mills & Broomberg, 1998). 
1 I am thankful to Professor Dr Terje P. Hagen for valuable comments on preliminary versions of this 
chapter. Dr Beate M. Huseby also provided helpful comments on a former draft. An earlier version of 
4The growing call for reorganisation within the Norwegian public sector is thus part of 
a larger reform wave sweeping across Western Europe. This wave has pointed to the 
private sector as the ideal when it comes to efficient service production, and 
privatisation strategies and market solutions have therefore been prescribed in the 
struggle to contain costs and produce more efficient services in the public sector.2 One 
of the governing ideas behind this new market orientation has been the desire to 
clarify the roles and responsibilities within the sector, particularly with regard to the 
purchaser–provider split. To achieve this, tight state control and surveillance over 
service production have had to be sacrificed to some extent, and through the 
introduction of performance-related reward systems and delegation of profit 
responsibilities to semi- or fully privatised production and service units, central 
government has gradually channelled considerable authority to this group of relatively 
autonomous service providers (Tranøy & Østerud, 2001). 
As the reform ideas gained momentum in Norway over the past decades, the public-
sector’s organisational structures became the target of pronounced alternations. By 
and large, there has been a steady change from traditional organisation in 
multipurpose administrative agencies within the county administration (characterised 
by strict hierarchical command and control structures) towards more organisation in 
single purpose units, such as trust companies, enterprises or private limited 
companies, which enjoy wide authority, a high degree of independence and 
considerable room to exercise discretion. The latter type of organisation naturally 
implies a much freer role for the operating units when it comes to choice of wage 
systems, regulation of working time, asset management and the overall running of the 
day-to-day activities. However, the controls employed by central government through 
laws, steering documents, circular letters and the like, have in fact proved to be 
relatively efficient, and compliance with centrally stated aims is therefore normally 
the chapter was presented at the Nordic Workshop on Health Management and Organization, 6–8 
December 2006, and the comments from Dr Karsten Vrangbæk were particularly appreciated. 
2 Studies comparing the relative efficiency of private and public organisations or enterprises have 
reached somewhat contradictory conclusions (e.g., Willner, 2000; Christensen, 2001; Christensen et al., 
2001; Saltman & Figueras, 1997; Leu, 1986; Savas, 1982; Bennett, 1996; Walker, 1989; Iversen, 1987; 
Liu et al., 2006; Loevinsohn & Hardin, 2005; Øvretveit, 2001), but the reviews of the existing literature 
on the field have generally concluded that privatisation measures and contracting out of services do 
contain costs. 
5ensured. Within the literature, the types of controls applied are commonly referred to 
as “fire alarm” systems and “autopilot” systems, which both provide feedbacks to the 
elected politicians and their administrations (cf. Sørensen, 2005; Norwegian Official 
Report, 1999; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). Fire alarms are commonly triggered by 
self-interested third parties, and financial audits, appointments of various ombudsman 
institutions and the passing of statutory rules regarding inspections are examples of 
arrangements which make their alarm-activity possible. Autopilot types of controls 
encompass operation of e.g. constitutional standardised norms which protect 
fundamental rights of the population and the users/consumers, application of 
administrative supervision and implementation of various types of administrative 
reporting responsibilities (e.g. through “management by objectives” (MBO)-types of 
arrangements). For a more detailed outline of these and similar arrangements, consult 
McCubbins & Schwartz (1984) or Sørensen (2005). 
In Norway, several large public units have recently been privatised or subject to other 
reorganisation in accordance with the methods described above. Some of these are the 
national telecommunication agency (Telenor), the Norwegian postal services (Posten 
Norge), the national railways (NSB), and the national oil and gas company (Statoil). 
The processes have taken rather different forms for the individual units, and while 
some of the former state agencies are now administered as public enterprises, others 
are organised as private limited companies with varying degrees of state share 
interest. For instance, the central government currently holds 54 per cent of the shares 
in the national telecommunication company, Telenor. As for the Norwegian health 
enterprises, which were established with the hospital reform of 2002, these are owned 
solely by the state with the five regional health authorities (RHAs) in charge of the 
administrative authority. 
In the aftermath of the public-sector reforms, the management of and public influence 
over the state-owned companies and privatised enterprises have been the subject of 
much political controversy. This has not least been the case for the healthcare sector. 
Although the political debate on this and similar private–public issues has been 
relatively heated and the topic, from time to time, high on the political agenda, 
international research on the subject has not kept pace. According to, e.g., Bennett 
(1996), a considerable range of highly relevant research questions in the area of the 
6private–public mix of healthcare has been ignored and remains unexplored. A decade 
ago, she furthermore claimed that most of the published literature on the private–
public mix of healthcare was limited to either theoretical works on the extent and 
form of market failure (e.g., Titmuss, 1963; Bennett, 1991) or to the production of 
typologies (e.g., Green, 1987; Berman, 1996). The remaining research was described 
as mainly descriptive. In addition to the groups mentioned by Bennett, several 
theoretical and empirical studies have, however, discussed private–public mix 
scenarios or assessed whether public, private or mixed healthcare models represent 
the best alternative under different, closer specified, conditions (e.g., Jofre-Bonet, 
2000; Silverman, 1984; Marchand & Schroyen, 2005; Propper & Green, 1999; Leu, 
1986; Chernichovsky, 2000; Barros & Martinez-Giralt, 2000; Crow et al., 2002). 
Other studies have addressed the interdependence between private and public 
healthcare (e.g., Cairns, 1986; Pryor, 1968, ch. IV), the relative efficiency of the two 
sectors (e.g., Judge, 1986; Sintonen, 1986), and the private–public mix in, and across, 
the different national healthcare systems (e.g., Rosenthal, 1992; Nicholl et al., 1989; 
Maynard, 2005; Poullier, 1986; Doyle & Bull, 2000; Banda & Simukonda, 1994; 
Besley & Gouveia, 1994; Roemer, 1984; Øvretveit, 2001). 
When considering the Nordic case, the gap in the literature is, however, even more 
evident (e.g., Poullier, 1986), and the gradual privatisation of the Nordic countries’ 
healthcare systems has not generated much attention from the respective countries’ 
research communities. According to Øvretveit (2003), the scarcity of research on the 
private–public mix is therefore striking and apart from some research on co-payments, 
there is “no research which has documented and compared the trends, or considered 
the effects of changes” (Øvretveit, 2001: 13). Øvretveit furthermore describes the 
debate about the private sector as largely uninformed by facts about the extent and 
type of private-sector involvement that has taken place within the public sector. 
Nevertheless, a small selection of studies providing an overview of the role of the 
private sector within the Nordic or Scandinavian countries is available (e.g., 
Øvretveit, 2001, 2003; Møller Pedersen, 2005). The most significant messages of 
these studies are that there seems to be a common historical heritage for preferring 
public models for provision of basic services such as education, employment, 
healthcare and infrastructure in the Nordic countries, and that the knowledge about 
Nordic private healthcare in general is very limited. These studies do, however, seek 
7to remedy this absence by comparing the national private–public mixes and by 
describing the individual countries’ private shares in healthcare financing and 
provision. 
A brief review of the existing literature on the Norwegian case largely supports 
Øvretveit’s observation of scarcity, as only a narrow range of issues is represented. In 
addition to the relatively limited number of studies on Norwegian primary care (e.g., 
Grytten et al., 2000; Sørensen & Grytten, 2000, 2003) there are broadly speaking 
three main groups of private providers that have been investigated: private contract 
specialists, private for-profit hospitals and private laboratories and X-ray institutes. 
The research topics can further be categorised into three groups: descriptive studies; 
theoretical studies; and studies combining theoretical and empirical analyses. Table 1 
provides a schematic overview of the contributions within the abovementioned 
categories. 
8 Private contract 
specialists 
Private for-
profit hospitals
Private 
laboratory and 
X-ray services 
Miscellaneous 
Descriptive     
Financing Iversen (2002); 
Brenne (2006) 
   
Accessibility/interaction Husum et al. (2004)    
Localisation/scope Eastern Regional 
Health Authority 
(2004); Northern 
Regional Health 
Authority (2005, 
2006); Kjekshus and 
Jørgenvåg (2005); 
Jørgenvåg et al. 
(2000); Jørgenvåg & 
Kjekshus (2004); 
Aarseth (1998) 
 Hagen et al. 
(2005); Hagen et 
al. (2007) 
Hofoss (1987) 
Jørgenvåg (2006)   
Theoretical     
Financing/efficiency    Iversen (1987) 
Waiting time Iversen (1986);   Iversen (1997)3
Hoel & Sæther (2000)   
Production Brekke & Sørgard (2000)   
Theoretical/Empirical     
Competition Iversen & Kopperud 
(2002) 
  Andersen et al. 
(2006) 
Financing    Emblem (2003) 
Physician choices/ 
practice combinations 
Askildsen & Holmås (2004)  Sæther (2005a, 
2005b) 
Table 1: Typology of the research literature on Norwegian private specialised healthcare according to 
type of study and segment of the private healthcare services investigated.
The first group represents descriptive studies and addresses aspects such as the 
financing of services, geographical location of private practices and the scope of 
private laboratory and X-ray services (Iversen, 2002; Brenne, 2006; Husum et al., 
2004; Eastern Regional Health Authority, 2004; Northern Regional Health Authority, 
2005, 2006; Kjekshus & Jørgenvåg, 2005; Jørgenvåg, 2006; Jørgenvåg et al., 2000; 
Jørgenvåg & Kjekshus, 2004; Aarseth, 1998; Hagen et al., 2005, 2007; Hofoss, 1987). 
These studies all provide important overviews of the distribution and extent of the 
various private healthcare services, but because of the recent changes in the private–
public mix, their main challenge is the constant need to update the empirical 
information. 
3 Although Iversen’s study does not address the Norwegian situation directly, the National Health 
Services (NHS) described in his theoretical model has evident similarities with the Norwegian 
healthcare system, and the study is therefore included in the typology. 
9The second group takes a rather theoretical approach and is concerned mainly with 
the private–public mix at the system level and how this affects other outcome 
variables such as the waiting time for treatment (Brekke & Sørgard, 2000; Hoel & 
Sæther, 2000; Iversen, 1986, 1987, 1997). Because the Norwegian healthcare system 
historically has been largely public, both with regard to the financing and the 
provision of the services, these studies do not incorporate empirical analyses. Rather, 
theoretical models are outlined that predict how the private alternative and the 
interplay between private and public healthcare may affect various relevant outcome 
parameters. However, the recent increase in the number of new private for-profit 
hospitals has not generated many empirical studies to test the validity of the 
theoretical arguments set out in these works. 
The third cluster of research contributions comprises empirical studies that combine 
theoretical and empirical analyses (Andersen et al., 2006; Askildsen & Holmås, 
2004; Iversen & Kopperud, 2002; Sæther, 2005a, 2005b; Emblem, 2003). These 
address questions related to, for example, the introduction of market models in 
Norwegian healthcare (Andersen et al., 2006), financing of healthcare through health 
insurance (Emblem, 2003) and the physician’s choice of work between public and 
private hospitals (Askildsen & Holmås, 2004). 
As seen from the matrix in Table 1, most of the studies performed so far are 
descriptive. Studies combining theoretical discussion with empirical analysis are, on 
the other hand, performed less frequently, and particularly rare are studies addressing 
the role of private for-profit hospitals. Among the theoretical and empirical analyses 
that have been performed, economic theories furthermore constitute the by far most 
frequent framework. This traditional dominance of economic theories within the 
healthcare literature is accompanied by a significant under-representation of other 
theoretical approaches. Given that several studies have found evidence of differences 
in variables such as the value orientation and the pecuniary versus non-pecuniary 
reward motivations of private and public-sector companies and employees (e.g., Le 
Grand & Robinson, 1989; Crewson, 1997; Brewer et al., 2000; Pratchett & Wingfield, 
1996; Ahmed, 1996; Kernaghan, 2000; Wittmer, 1991; Rawls et al., 1975; Rainey, 
1982; Gabris & Simo, 1995), research questions addressing also these aspects should 
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be investigated. Whereas economic theories have focused rather exclusively on 
pecuniary explanations of decision making and behaviour, the abovementioned 
studies suggest that also non-pecuniary explanations may be important. The 
combination of pecuniary and non-pecuniary explanatory models may therefore make 
the theoretical outline fit better with the real-world setting of the healthcare sector in 
general and the decision making by medical personnel in particular (cf. Frey, 1997). 
When considering all facets of the private–public divide available for research, the 
scope of empirical studies performed to date is indisputably very limited. As the 
recent upswing in the private supply of healthcare services in Norway has broadened 
and diversified the labour market for physicians, the scant representation of empirical 
studies addressing the effects of this shift is quite striking. Especially striking is the 
lack of studies carried out on physicians’ sector-related choices. Moreover, physicians 
working in the private and public sectors have rarely been compared with each other 
to observe how they perform on interesting outcome variables such as labour supply, 
allocation of working time and the influence of contextual factors on their choices. 
The large spectrum of unanswered questions thus warrants more research on the topic.  
This dissertation is made up of four essays that address the private–public divide in 
Norwegian specialised healthcare from different angles. More specifically, the 
geographic distribution of private and public specialised healthcare supply, the 
medical specialists’ sector choices and the effects of sector affiliation on allocation of 
working time and labour supply are assessed.4 The four research questions are 
specified as follows: 
(i) There are considerable differences in the use of private specialised care 
between the different geographic areas of Norway. How can differences in 
public and private healthcare supply between defined geographic localities 
be explained? 
(ii) Most Norwegian physicians are employed in the public sector, but lately 
the share of physicians taking full- or part-time jobs in the private sector 
has increased. What explains physicians’ sector choices? Is it primarily 
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pecuniary aspects, or are also non-pecuniary factors important? How do 
contextual factors contribute to the understanding of this particular type of 
job decision? 
(iii) Several studies have documented fundamental differences in the value 
orientation and motivation of private and public-sector employees, and 
those in the private sector are commonly found to be more highly 
motivated by extrinsic rewards than are their public-sector counterparts. 
However, most of the labour supply literature promotes only monetary 
explanations. How do pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects relate to 
Norwegian medical specialists’ labour supply, and are there sector-
dependent differences? 
(iv) Internal organisation of work and available wage incentives are likely to 
vary between the private and the public sectors. These differences, 
together with the physicians’ personal preferences and the demand factors 
in the surrounding populations, may affect allocation of available working 
time between patient-related work, administrative duties and 
research/educational job tasks. How does the internal organisation of 
work, wage incentives, personal preferences and demand-specific aspects 
relate to the relative time private and public medical specialists spend on 
the different job assignments? 
A fuller outline of the research questions and the results obtained from the empirical 
analyses are found in Section 5 and Chapters 2–5. 
The rest of this chapter continues as follows: First, in Section 2, the private element of 
Norwegian healthcare is discussed. Next, Section 3 outlines the theoretical approaches 
employed. Section 4 elaborates on topics related to the methods and data material, and 
Section 5 sums up the empirical evidence from the four essays. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the chapter and presents some suggestions for future research. 
4 This thesis focuses mainly on the supply side, and aspects of the demand side are therefore given a 
less central role. 
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2. The private sector 
According to Saltman & Bergman (2005) the Swedish (and the Scandinavian) 
healthcare system is to a high degree characterised by the core social norms and 
values held by its citizenry, and first and foremost by equality and security values. 
Hence, the tax-based financing and the publicly operated hospitals characteristic for 
the Scandinavian countries may be seen as a reflection of the fundamental values 
deeply embedded in the countries’ national character. As the Norwegian healthcare 
system traditionally has been a mainly public system, both with regards to the funding 
and the provision of specialised care, the most recent entry of private for-profit actors 
into the supply structure appears as somewhat of a novelty.5
Privatisation is a multifaceted concept and can take different meanings depending on 
the context in which it is applied. The long-lasting controversy associated with how 
the concept should be understood and defined is thus captured quite accurately by 
Morris (1999): 
“The academic debate over privatization began in earnest some 25 years ago, and since 
that time scholars have searched for a conceptual framework that provides meaning to 
both academics and practitioners.” (Morris, 1999: 152) 
Despite this debate over which aspects of change a privatisation term should cover, 
most researchers agree that it captures a range of service arrangements that may be 
used by public decision makers (e.g., Morris, 1999; Starr, 1988; Bach, 2000; 
Øvretveit, 2001, 2003; Braddon & Foster, 1996), and that represents a change “from 
an arrangement with high government involvement to one with less” (Savas, 1987: 
88). Correspondingly, this means a change to an arrangement where the private sector 
plays a more dominant and active role. Due to this broad meaning of the privatisation 
concept, it has been applied to describe a diverse set of models (e.g., Øvretveit, 2001, 
2003; Bennett, 1996; Berman, 1996; Maynard, 2005; Bach, 2000; Le Grand & 
Robinson, 1989), and over time numerous measures have, as a result, been embraced 
by the concept. 
5 See the appendix for an account of the contextual and distinctive historical characteristics of the 
Norwegian healthcare system. 
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According to Iversen (1985), privatisation (and changes in privatisation) can be 
observed along at least three dimensions: financing, ownership and control. With 
regard to the financing of services, private elements incorporate arrangements such as 
out-of-pocket payments from the users/consumers and the purchase of private or 
company insurances. Ownershipwise the units providing services are most frequently 
organised as either fully publicly owned institutions, institutions owned by private 
non-profit or for-profit organisations or practices owned partially or fully by the 
personnel working there. Finally, the control exercised over private institutions by the 
central authorities may influence the degree of actual independence and autonomy 
enjoyed by the enterprises/practices. Iversen’s privatisation dimensions are revisited 
and discussed more thoroughly in relation to the Norwegian specialised healthcare 
system in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
2.1 Privatisation of healthcare 
The private–public mix of provision and funding of healthcare services differs 
somewhat within the various healthcare models. For example, the American model is 
based heavily on private insurances paid either by the individuals themselves or by 
their employers, and except for Medicare and Medicaid arrangements, which provide 
free healthcare to elderly, disabled and indigent people, most of the provision of care 
takes place within private hospitals. The two most common healthcare models in 
Western Europe—the Beveridge and Bismarck models—involve less reliance on 
private solutions, and although the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD’s) overviews show that private funding (co-payments or 
payment of insurance premiums) is somewhat more common within the Bismarck 
than in the Beveridge model, the private element in the Bismarck–style systems is still 
very moderate (see Table 2). Furthermore, both Beveridge- and Bismarck-style 
models are known to have relatively extensive public safety nets for their populations.  
14 
Public–private mix Country
Mainly public provision, public finance Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom 
Mixed provision, public finance Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand
Mainly private provision, public finance Canada 
Mixed provision, mixed finance Netherlands 
Mainly private provision, private finance Switzerland, United States 
Table 2: Classification of countries by public–private mix of provision and finance in healthcare 
(Source: OECD classification reproduced in Propper & Green, 1999). 
As can be seen from Table 2, most countries with Beveridge-style models have a 
predominantly public funding and provision regime.6 In contrast, countries with social 
health insurance (SHI) financing have a somewhat more mixed distribution of 
providers.7 In these countries it is for instance not uncommon for sickness funds to 
contract with private providers of specialised care. 
In the Norwegian healthcare system, both funding and provision of services have 
historically been largely public. Although the overall financing of specialised 
healthcare still remains public, the traditional public delivery of services has been 
challenged in the past decade. The most pronounced change has involved the 
establishment of several private for-profit hospitals and the increased interest taken in 
the role of the private contract specialists (e.g., Northern Regional Health Authority, 
2005, 2006; Eastern Regional Health Authority, 2004). Although the Norwegian 
healthcare system also includes other private actors, such as private specialists 
without contracts,8 private laboratories and X-ray institutes,9 hospitals owned by 
6 For a more detailed description of the private–public mix in Scandinavian healthcare, see e.g. Møller 
Pedersen (2005). 
7 Switzerland and The Netherlands have chosen somewhat atypical solutions, with mainly mixed or 
private providers. Consult Exter et al. (2004), Minder et al. (2000) and Saltman et al. (2004) for a more 
detailed outline. 
8 Private specialists without contracts receive neither grants from the RHAs nor reimbursement from 
the National Insurance Scheme (NIS), and consequently they base their practices on income from out–
of–pocket payments and reimbursements from private insurance companies. At present approximately 
0.6 per cent of the Norwegian population is estimated to be covered by some sort of private insurance 
(special voluntary supplementary health insurance) (Møller Pedersen, 2005). The size of the patient 
fees and the payments from private insurance companies are naturally not subject to any 
comprehensive controls or regulations by central government (Iversen, 2002), and thus little statistics 
and information are available about these practices’ income and activity.
9 The scope of activities and costs of private laboratories and X–ray institutes are quite substantial, and 
altogether private X–ray institutes produce approximately one third of the total services, while private 
laboratories perform approximately 17 per cent of all laboratory tests each year (Hagen et al., 2005). 
The division of work between the private and the public units are, however, rather uneven, as the 
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private non-profit organisations10, private general practitioners (GPs),11 private 
physiotherapists, private pharmacies and private dentists,12 the main focus henceforth 
in this thesis will be on private contract specialists and private for-profit hospitals, 
which at present represent the two perhaps most dominant private elements within the 
Norwegian specialised care provision.13
2.2  Private contract specialists 
During the past decades, the number of contracts held by private specialists has been 
highly dependent upon the central and local legislation guiding their rights and duties. 
The arrangement with grants from the counties was established in 1984, before which 
time the private specialists were not subject to any direct public control. Furthermore, 
the specialists’ financial incentives to enter contracts were largely absent until 1998, 
when all private specialists had to enter contracts with the counties to be entitled to 
reimbursements from the NIS. Consequently, the growth in the number of contract 
practices following this change in reality only reflected a desire for tighter central 
control over this group of specialists, and did not imply an increase in the number of 
private practices in real terms.  
The entered contracts were differentiated according to size (20–100 per cent of an 
estimated man-labour year/full-time equivalent (FTE)) and categorised in different 
private X–ray institutes are mainly concerned with mammography–, ultrasound–, computerised axial 
tomography (CAT)– and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) examinations without the use of contrast 
fluid, and public hospitals are in charge of the more advanced consultations. As for the laboratory 
services, public laboratories naturally perform more acute testing than their private equivalents. 
10 For a description of Norwegian somatic hospitals’ ownership structure throughout the 1990s, see e.g. 
Hansen (2001).  
11 For more detailed information about the contract design of, and service provision by, Norwegian 
GPs, consult Sørensen & Grytten (2000, 2003) and Grytten et al. (2000).  
12 Private physiotherapy and dentistry are discussed more thoroughly by, e.g., Hofoss (1987) and 
Møller Pedersen (2005). Also see Møller Pedersen for an outline of the organisation of pharmacies. 
13 Patients can be referred directly by their GP to a private contract specialist or a private for-profit 
hospital holding a contract. They may also choose themselves to be referred to a private practice or 
institution, or be transferred following consultation in a public hospital. However, for treatment to be 
covered by public financing arrangements, the patients should be referred by a hospital physician or a 
GP (cf. Eastern Regional Health Authority, 2004). 
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expense classes.14 The marked increase from 1997 to 1998 in the number of contracts 
and FTEs comprised by contracts is shown in Table 3.15
1991 1997 1998 2001 2004 
Internal medicine 54 (49) 48 (43) 99 (75) 98 (73) 87 (66) 
Dermatovenereology 30 (28) 34 (31) 66 (53) 66 (54) 71 (55) 
Paediatrics 20 (19) 18 (17) 44 (34) 43 (33) 42 (28) 
Neurology 6 (5) 7 (6) 25 (15) 23 (14) 27 (14) 
General surgery 5 (4) 6 (5) 34 (20) 27 (14) 21 (14) 
Obstetrics-
gynaecology 
53 (49) 45 (43) 103 (85) 103 (87) 104 (88) 
Rheumatology 4 (4) 4 (4) 16 (10) 16 (10) 15 (9) 
Otorhinolaryngology 42 (41) 52 (47) 102 (71) 136 (91) 137 (91) 
Ophthalmology 82 (79) 92 (86) 138 (109) 177 (137) 195 (152) 
Other speciality 7 (6) 11 (10) 63 (34) 87 (42) 102 (53) 
Total 303 (285) 317 (291) 690 (507) 776 (555) 801 (569) 
Table 3: Number of contracts per speciality (FTEs in parentheses), 1991, 1997, 1998, 2001 and 2004. 
(Source: Statistics Norway). 
The largest absolute increase in both the number of contracts and the FTEs throughout 
the period from 1991 to 2004 occurred for the otorhinolaryngology and 
ophthalmology specialities. Moreover, as shown in Figure 1, the total increase was 
larger for the number of contracts than for the number of FTEs, implying that a 
relatively high frequency of contracts cover less than 100 per cent of an estimated 
man-labour year.16
14 The contracts are placed in different categories (class 1–3) based on, i.e., the need for expensive 
equipment and assistant personnel and the costs of hiring the premises of the practice. The different 
classes qualify for unequally sized grants (The Norwegian Medical Association, 2005). 
15 For a more detailed account of the institutional framework for private contract specialists, consult 
Midttun & Hagen (2006). 
16 A 100 per cent practice contract is estimated to equal 37.5 hours a week of work during at least 44 
weeks of the year. The lower limit for the size of the contracts is set at 20 per cent (The Norwegian 
Medical Association, 2005). 
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Figure 1: Number of private specialist contracts and FTEs, 1991–2001, excluding psychiatry. (Source: 
Statistics Norway). 
Geographically, the private contract specialists are distributed relatively unevenly, 
and the Eastern RHA has entered the by far highest number of contracts within each 
field of speciality. The gaps with the other regions are most marked with respect to 
otorhinolaryngology, paediatrics, obstetrics-gynaecology and ophthalmology (cf. 
Table 4). 
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East South West Mid-
Norway 
North Total 
Internal medicine 48 (2.9) 21 (2.4) 7 (0.7) 7 (1.1) 4 (0.9) 87 (1.9) 
Dermatovenereology 35 (2.1) 14 (1.6) 9 (1.0) 11 (1.7) 2 (0.4) 71 (1.6) 
Paediatrics 31 (1.9) 3 (0.3) 1 (0.1) 6 (0.9) 1 (0.2) 42 (0.9) 
Neurology 12 (0.7) 6 (0.7) 4 (0.4) 3 (0.5) 2 (0.4) 27 (0.6) 
General surgery 9 (0.5) 5 (0.6) 3 (0.3) 3 (0.5) 1 (0.2) 21 (0.5) 
Obstetrics-
gynaecology 44 (2.7) 24 (2.7) 20 (2.1) 8 (1.2) 8 (1.7) 104 (2.3) 
Rheumatology 7 (0.4) 3 (0.3) 4 (0.4) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 15 (0.3) 
Otorhinolaryngology 62 (3.8) 23 (2.6) 26 (2.8) 15 (2.3) 11 (2.4) 137 (3.0) 
Ophthalmology 76 (4.6) 38 (4.3) 34 (3.6) 28 (4.4) 19 (4.1) 195 (4.3) 
Other speciality 45 (2.7) 13 (1.5) 31 (3.3) 8 (1.2) 5 (1.1) 102 (2.2) 
Total 369 (22.5) 150 (16.8) 139 (14.8) 89 (13.8) 54 (11.7) 801 (17.5) 
Table 4: Number of contracts per speciality (contracts per 100,000 inhabitants in parentheses) for the 
Norwegian RHAs in 2004, excluding psychiatry. (Source: Statistics Norway). 
The table shows further that the Eastern RHA has the highest number of contracts 
both in absolute figures and relative to its population size, with more than 20 contracts 
per 100,000 inhabitants. The Southern, Western and Mid-Norwegian RHAs have 
relatively similar rates of 17, 15 and 14 contracts per 100,000 inhabitants, 
respectively. Even when standardising the figures for population size, the Northern 
RHA’s contract frequency is clearly lowest, and in this region, fewer than 12 
contracts are entered per 100,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, figures from the Northern 
RHA indicate that about 25 per cent of the somatic elective outpatient activities is 
provided by private contract specialists, and that as much as 73 per cent of the 
outpatient consultations performed within the field of ophthalmology, and 40 per cent 
within the otorhinolaryngology speciality, is conducted by private specialists 
(Northern Regional Health Authority, 2005; Jørgenvåg, 2006). 
Table 4 moreover reveals that only the Eastern RHA has a total rate above the mean 
national rate. This suggests that the Eastern region is substantially overrepresented 
with regard to the scope of contracts entered. 
If we inspect the private contract specialists using Iversen’s (1985) three dimensions 
of privatisation—financing, ownership and control—we see that the specialists’ main 
sources of financing are fee-for-service reimbursements from the NIS, operating 
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grants from the RHAs, activity-based financing (ABF) for day surgery (from 2001), 
co-payments from patients and full out-of-pocket payment by some of the patients. 
Co-payments from patients contribute, however, only marginally to the contract 
specialists’ total incomes. As for the size of the operating grant this varies according 
to which of the three classes the practice is placed within and the size of the contract 
(20 to 100 per cent of an estimated man-labour year/FTE). The financing is therefore 
determined, to a high degree, by the RHAs and central government, which decide on 
the scope of the ABF-financed day surgical activity outsourced, the size of the private 
practice contracts and the generosity of the NIS tariffs.17
The ownership of the practices is defined as private (e.g., sole proprietorships, 
individual enterprises or limited companies), and the specialists are self-employed. 
When the specialist holding the contract approaches the age of retirement or for other 
reasons decides to sell the practice, the practice is transferred to a new specialist, who 
is often recommended by the previous owner. If the parties cannot agree upon a price, 
a publicly appointed committee settles the dispute. The RHAs are, however, 
responsible for the final decision about the transfer of the contract, and may even alter 
the location or the field of speciality for which the contract applies (The Norwegian 
Medical Association, 2005; Northern Regional Health Authority, 2005). The RHAs 
are also able to change or even cancel existing contracts. 
Many of the contract practices’ framework conditions—especially those related to 
funding—are controlled centrally. The overall conditions and juridical terms of the 
agreements are for instance initially negotiated between the Norwegian Medical 
Association and the RHAs, and documented in the central framework agreement. 
Next, individual contracts, negotiated within the framework of the abovementioned 
agreement, are outlined between the respective RHA and the individual contract 
specialist. The contracting process is thus subject to relatively strict control by the 
regional authorities and the Norwegian Medical Association, and until only recently 
the RHAs had the opportunity to, e.g., instruct contracted specialists to conduct up to 
eight hours of public work per week (The Norwegian Medical Association, 2005). 
The contract specialists have therefore been subject to significant public control and 
17 For a more detailed elaboration of the financing arrangements for the Norwegian contract specialists, 
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the increased integration in the overall planning and co-ordination of the RHAs (e.g., 
Eastern Regional Health Authority, 2004; Northern Regional Health Authority, 2005, 
2006) has to some extent contributed to a further curtailment of their autonomy. In 
summary, the private contract specialists are thus influenced rather heavily by central 
government and the RHAs, especially with regard to the financing and control 
exercised throughout the contracting process. Substantial interventions are also in 
place to control the ownership of the practices. Nevertheless, the ownership is private 
and the volume of their activity is not, and has not been, subject to any public 
restrictions. Consequently, the private contract specialists are regulated heavily within 
some realms of their practice, but enjoy more independence within others. 
2.3 Private for-profit hospitals 
The first Norwegian private for-profit hospital (Ringsenteret, later Volvat) was 
established in 1985 (Berg, 2006). Because the idea of commercial hospitals was quite 
new at the time, the pace of the establishing of this type of hospital was modest at 
first, and by 2001 only six private for-profit hospitals were authorised by the Ministry 
of Health. Gradually, however, the authorities embarked on a privatisation strategy, 
which accelerated the increase in the number of licensed private for-profit hospitals. 
One of the efforts making large-scale outsourcing of day surgical activities to the 
private sector possible was the 1999 resolution to integrate day surgery in the ABF 
system. Together with the Ministry of Health’s pronounced increase in the number of 
authorisations, this led to a peak in the number of commercial hospitals. Boosted by 
the guidelines drawn up by the 2002 hospital reform, which emphasised the equal 
status of private and public healthcare providers in the quest towards achieving the 
specialised healthcare sector’s goals, the use of private healthcare services expanded 
even further. By 2004, Norway therefore had 28 licensed private for-profit hospitals 
(see Table 5). Most of these were located in the largest cities and in the central eastern 
and southern parts of Norway, surrounding the capital city Oslo. 
consult Midttun & Hagen (2006). 
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Table 5: Norwegian authorised private for-profit somatic hospitals, 2004 (Source: Legekunsten, 2005a).
As a result of the widespread authorisation of private for-profit hospitals and the 
subsequent contracting between some of these hospitals and the RHAs, the privately 
produced proportion of the total diagnosis-related group (DRG) production increased 
from 0.5 per cent in 1999 to 3.3 per cent in 2004. If looking at only the day surgical 
activity, which represents the greater part of the private for-profit hospital activity, 
private for-profit hospitals accounted for 45 per cent of the total increase from 2001 to 
2004 (The Norwegian Patient Register, 2006). 
18 The degree of centrality of the municipality in which the hospital’s main location is, as specified by 
Statistics Norway’s centrality index (see Norsk Offentlig Statistikk, 1993). The centrality index can 
vary from 1 to 7 and is based on the population density and the geographic position of the municipality 
in relation to a centre where a higher order of central functions is found (Midttun, 2007c; Norsk 
Offentlig Statistikk, 1993). The higher the value on the index, the more centrally located the 
municipality. 
Hospitals Location Degree of centrality18
Omnia sykehuset Kristiansand 7 
Omnia sykehuset Bergen 7 
Ishavsklinikken Tromsø 7 
Vestnorsk Ortopediske sykehus (Casperkollen) Bergen 7 
Haugesund Lasersenter a/s Haugesund 7 
Fana medisinske senter Bergen 7 
Rosenborg sportsklinikk a/s Trondheim 7 
Medisinske senter a/s  Telemark Mean value Telemark county: 4 
Volvat Medisinske senter Oslo (Bergen, Fredrikstad, Hamar) 7 
Volvat – enhet for spiseforstyrrelser, Vestfold Tønsberg 5 
Axess sykehus og spesialistklinikk Oslo 7 
Ringvoll Klinikken Hobøl, Askim 5 
Medi 3 Ålesund 6 
Medi 3 Molde 6 
Drammen private sykehus Drammen 7 
Klinikk Stokkan Trondheim 7 
Klinikk Stokkan Tromsø 7 
Colosseumklinikken Oslo 7 
Colosseumklinikken Stavanger 5 
Vestfjordklinikken Bodø 6 
Trondheim Spesialistlegesenter Trondheim 7 
Norsk Idrettsmedisinsk Institutt Oslo (Haslum, Slemmestad, 
Beitostølen, Hønefoss)
7
Moxness Klinikken Trondheim 7 
Mjøs–kirurgene Gjøvik, Lillehammer 5, 7 
Idrettsklinikken a/s Fredrikstad 5 
Haugesund private sykehus Haugesund 7 
Klinikk Bergen/Bergen Ortopediske Sykehus Bergen 7 
Spesial-Helse-Senteret–MosseAkutten Moss 5 
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Analysing the privatisation represented by private for-profit hospitals along Iversen’s 
(1985) key dimensions of privatisation (financing, ownership and control) shows that 
the enormous growth in the commercial hospitals’ activity following the hospital 
reform should be viewed in relation to the RHAs’ financing of a substantial part of 
this activity. In the wake of the reform, extensive contracts were namely entered 
between several private for-profit hospitals and the RHAs to reduce the waiting lists 
and waiting times for patient treatment and to remedy the problems caused by high 
occupancy rates at the public hospitals. Some of the contracts were limited to a certain 
number of consultations or admissions, whereas others only defined the economic 
terms (price per DRG) of the agreement (i.e., no upper limit for the private hospitals’ 
production volume was specified). Frequently, the reimbursement size was given as a 
proportion of the DRG price for the current patient group, and the contracts usually 
lasted two to three years before new tenders were invited. In addition to the negotiated 
DRG prices, some of the private for-profit hospital’s income is generated by co-
payment from patients, but the scope of these payments is only minor and their 
proportion of the overall finances even decreased somewhat from 1990 to 2000 (cf. 
Møller Pedersen, 2005). However, some of the treatment provided at private for-profit 
hospitals is financed entirely by out-of-pocket payments by the patients (e.g., for 
plastic surgery performed mainly for cosmetic rather than medical purposes). Finally, 
the NIS has each year purchased specialised healthcare services from private for-
profit hospitals for treatment of a number of wait-listed patients on sick leave.19
The ownership of the private for-profit hospitals is, naturally, in private hands, and the 
hospitals are organised, most frequently, as private limited companies with private 
shareholders. According to Øvretveit (2001), for-profit health organisations are 
“commercial businesses which exist to provide a return on the finance invested by 
shareholders” (Øvretveit, 2001: 30), and the ownership structure thus indicates that 
the private for-profit hospitals, as independent contractors, are under less central 
control than are the public hospitals. The independence of private for-profit hospitals 
is nevertheless limited by central authorities in many respects. First, because the 
19 The private for-profit hospitals receive no basic grants from the central government and are not 
entitled to regular fee-for-service reimbursements from the NIS for outpatient consultations 
(Stortingsmelding nr. 5 (2003–2004)). 
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hospitals are not given ABF reimbursements for treatments other than those specified 
in the contracts with the RHAs (cf. Ministry of Health, 2002), the relative 
downscaling of the volume of the activities contracted out during the last bidding 
round led to severe financial problems for many commercial hospitals (cf. 
Legekunsten, 2005b). Second, central government can exert significant control 
through their role as administrator of the hospital authorisation process. Third, in 
more principal issues, such as advertising regulations, the private for-profit hospitals’ 
room to manoeuvre has been narrowed somewhat by the central authorities’ 
legislation. 
To summarise, the degree of “privateness” associated with the private for-profit 
hospitals is strongest with regard to the ownership structure. There is, on the other 
hand, substantial public intervention in the funding of the hospitals’ activity. 
Furthermore, if compared with the private contract specialists, the contracting process 
has imposed much tighter control on the activity volume, and thereby on the public 
reimbursements these hospitals receive. 
3. The theoretical approach 
As outlined in the introductory section, the aims of this dissertation are to describe 
and analyse the private–public mix in Norwegian specialised healthcare and to study 
the vocational choices and labour supply of medical specialists with private or public-
sector affiliation. These objectives are related to two analytical levels: the physician 
level and the local or regional contextual level, and theoretically as well as 
empirically, both economic and non-economic incentives of decision making and 
behaviour are considered. Although this may seem ambitious, the relatively wide 
scope of the aim mirrors the extremely complex nature of the issues at hand. Work 
values, context-dependent aspects, personal attributes, job-related factors and 
economic incentives are therefore considered combined when analysing and 
explaining the empirical material. 
Throughout the empirical part of the dissertation, theoretical approaches related to 
rational choice theory are applied. In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 the explanatory 
mechanisms and characteristics of rational choice models are therefore briefly 
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accounted for. An outline of an “extended” model is discussed in more depth in 
Section 3.3. 
3.1 Scientific explanations and explanatory mechanisms 
When discussing what scientific explanations more fundamentally are, and which 
functions they should fulfil, the two extreme points of covering law and hermeneutics 
are often referred to. As regards the former, the covering law model is frequently 
termed “the deductive-nomological model” (Skog, 1998) and associated with the 
works of Carl G. Hempel (Hempel, 1966). Basically, the covering law model 
prescribes explanation of empirical observations by means of general laws, through 
statements such as “phenomenon B occurred because condition A was present, and 
because law L states that when this condition is present B will occur” (cf. Skog, 
1998). The covering law model furthermore outlines relatively strict standards for 
calling an explanation a “scientific explanation”. For an explanation to fulfil these 
requirements, it should be a deduction of a statement (explanadum) where the 
premises (explanans) are scientific laws (Hempel, 1966). According to the covering 
law perspective, explanations are thus only to be accepted as scientific and valid in 
“deductive-nomological” respects if the premises on which they are based are true, 
i.e., the explanadum is a logical consequence of the explanans. Because of these 
relatively strict requirements, the covering law model is often described as highly 
mechanical and deterministic (cf. Hovi & Rasch, 1996). A less restrictive type of 
explanation is represented by the inductive-statistical model. The laws included in 
these models only need to be of a statistical character, i.e., expressing the likelihood of 
B resulting from the presence of A. According to Hempel, the magnitude of the 
probabilistic statements should, however, be high and the likelihoods preferably close 
to 1 (Hovi & Rasch, 1996). 
The other extreme point when discussing explanations is represented by hermeneutics 
or phenomenology. According to the interpretive view promoted by this side, human 
behaviour cannot, and should not, be explained through application of the covering 
law principles. Rather, understanding the intentions and fundamental meanings 
guiding human behaviour and action is assumed to be the key, and no human action is 
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thus believed to follow necessarily or logically from some closer specified motives or 
incitements (cf. Hovi & Rasch, 1996). 
Numerous objections have been put forward against both the covering law approach 
and the hermeneutic view, and the two respective sides probably represent each 
other’s most eager opponents. A middle position is, however, offered by the 
“mechanism explanations”, which does not seek to establish general psychological 
laws, but focuses instead on behavioural dispositions or tendencies. The most 
common and general explanatory principle applied within the mechanism perspective 
is furthermore the assumption of some sort of rational behaviour (Hovi & Rasch, 
1996). The decisions that individuals arrive at are therefore assumed to be based on 
rational reasoning pursuant to the person’s preferences, the information available, etc. 
When applying mechanism explanations, more loosely defined laws are thus applied 
instead of the traditional general laws prescribed by the covering law approach. 
Hence, statistical statements take the roles of explanans, with the inevitable 
consequence that the room for predictions and generalisations are limited accordingly. 
Hovi & Rasch (1996) explain mechanism explanations as follows: 
“If the explanadum is an observed regularity, correlation or tendency etc. then this can be 
explained through law subsumption, even though the general laws in questions are in fact 
>only@ of a statistical nature, i.e., expressions of propensities and tendencies. Strictly 
speaking, this means that the most relevant structure for explanations within disciplines 
such as political science is primarily the deductive-statistical one rather than the 
deductive-nomological. In both cases, the deductive element is, however, ensured (as 
opposed to in the inductive-statistical explanations): The explanadum phenomenon is to 
be expected on the basis of the premises given.” (Hovi & Rasch, 1996: 56, my 
translation) 
Within the social sciences most explanations are probably placed somewhere between 
the two extremes of covering law and hermeneutics, an observation highly congruent 
with the understanding communicated by Skog (1998). Skog states, namely, that the 
social sciences tend to explain events without presupposing that they necessarily had 
to take place, but with an assumption that they were rational given the preferences or 
opinions of the actors involved and the particular circumstances in which the incidents 
took place (Skog, 1998: 30). The empirical studies incorporated in this dissertation 
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offer neither explanations of a deductive-nomological character, nor do they surrender 
completely to phenomenological reasoning. Instead, the explanations follow the 
mechanism explanations approach and are, as in most social scientific works, of a 
more probabilistic style. The choices and decisions of the medical specialists are 
therefore, on the one hand, not assumed to be explained entirely by one or a few 
general law-like explanans, yet, on the other hand, they are neither believed to be 
without similarities within or across the different groups. The types of explanations 
offered in the empirical part is therefore highly similar to the mechanism approach 
and can, as a result, be placed somewhere between the extremes of covering law and 
hermeneutics. 
3.2 A rational choice model of decision making 
Rational choice theory is generally acknowledged as an economic theory, which 
gradually throughout the 1960s, became embedded in the social sciences. Originally 
associated with methodological individualism and a genuinely microeconomic 
approach, Olson’s (1965) contribution, called “the logic of collective action”, 
represented the first attempt to include social actors and the concept of collective 
rationality into the theory. This relatively controversial endeavour slowly extended 
the rational choice models to the fields of psychology and sociology.20
According to classical rational choice theory, human behaviour is assumed to be 
directed by reason and guided by instrumentality, i.e., the best available means to 
pursue the desired ends is expected to be chosen (e.g., Elster, 1992). For a choice to 
be rational, it should furthermore be based on complete information and consistency 
in the ranking of preferences (the transitivity requirement). In the ideal model of 
rational choice, individuals are therefore thought to have complete information about 
all alternative courses of action available and to foresee all possible consequences of 
these actions, in particular with regard to their goal achievement potential. Based on 
this information, the actor is assumed to be able to range his or her preferences in a 
consistent, transitive manner and to reach a decision that maximises his or her utility. 
20 For a more thorough discussion of this and related topics, consult e.g. Zey (1998). 
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This traditional view of rational choice theory has, however, been discussed 
extensively and challenged. The criterion of transitivity has for instance frequently 
been accused of not necessarily condition rational decision making (Arrow, 1982; 
Miljkovic, 2005). In addition, Elster (1992) addressed some of the other aspects 
considered as major shortcomings of the classical version of the theory, and 
questioned i.a. the requirement of an absolute form of instrumental rationality. 
According to Elster, the assumption of instrumental rationality is namely utopian as 
individuals can only act rationally insofar as they decide in favour of the means that 
they believe to be most optimal. This implies that the chosen alternative is not 
necessarily the best option available per se, but the best option that the person has 
knowledge of. Elster (among others) also claimed that maximisation of expected 
utility always takes place within a particular contextual time and space, and that the 
time perspective within which the decision has to be reached may impose severe 
constraints upon the ability to arrive at optimal outcomes. In certain settings, it may 
therefore appear as more rational for an actor to make a relatively quick, but sub-
optimal decision instead of a more time-consuming optimal choice. In the literature, 
the former type of suboptimal decision making has been termed “satisficing”, whereas 
the latter type is commonly called “optimising” (cf. March & Simon, 1958). 
“(…) a further imperfection in human rationality—one which inevitably concerns all of 
us—is due to the fact that it may take too much time, energy, etc. to calculate the global 
maximum within the range of the present possibilities. Worse, often we do not even know 
how much time such a calculation would cost. In many cases we should therefore be 
satisfied with a local maximum (...) That is to say, since there is no instant rationality, we 
shall often have to opt for some local maximum. The theoretical concept of rationality as 
global maximum has to give in to the practical concept of satisficing rationality.” 
(Derksen, 1984: 556) 
To an increasing extent, particularly within the social sciences, this type of bounded 
rationality is considered to fit better to the real life setting than the perfect 
(instrumental) rationality concept. Furthermore, the critique targeted at rational choice 
theory, which attacks the assumption of fully informed individuals, has led to the 
development of more complex game theoretical models, in which the challenges 
induced by uncertainty and asymmetric and imperfect information to some degree are 
met. The incorporation of information shortcomings is for instance dealt with through 
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the modelling of, e.g., games with multiple participants, participants with limited 
information, players with cooperative or non-cooperative strategies and games 
integrating dynamic elements. Some of the most well-known games are the 
“principal-agent games”, whose typical characteristics are the imperfect information 
held by one or both parties in the relationship. Other well-known games are the 
prisoner’s dilemma game, the chicken game and the tragedy of the commons. 
As mentioned in the introduction, different conceptions of rationality can be found 
within the literature. Elster, for instance, makes a distinction between a “thin” and a 
“broad” theory of rational choice. Whereas the “thin” theory is characterised by 
“fixed preferences, cardinal utilities, subjectively construed probabilities, and 
conformity to appropriate axioms of choice” (Little, 1992: 1), the “broad” approach 
addresses also the deliberation of how preferences arise and potentially change over 
time. The broad approach moreover stresses the need for preferences to be based on 
autonomous and reflected reasoning to facilitate rational decision making (Hovi & 
Rasch, 1993). Although the main focus within neoclassical economy traditionally has 
been on the thin variant of rationality—with material costs-benefits trade offs and the 
economic logic of individuals (and firms or institutions) dominating—immaterial 
preferences, norms and rule following, and how these aspects influence rational 
decision making, are considered in other variants of rational choice models (e.g., Zey, 
1998). Within the vocational behaviour literature, research on work values has for 
instance revealed that immaterial, non-pecuniary aspects may affect job-related 
decision making. Work values are therefore commonly seen as part of a person’s 
intrinsic motivational structure and assumed to be more stable and fundamental than 
other sources of motivation and highly changeable preferences. According to, e.g., 
Vroom (1995) and Lawler (1971), individuals are prone to maximise also their non-
pecuniary values, a point highlighted in particular within the expectancy-valence 
theories. The expectancy-valence theory therefore prescribes investigation of not only 
the person’s values, but also the understanding the person has about the compatibility 
between his or her value structures and the different courses of actions available. I 
will return to a more extensive discussion of work values shortly (see Section 3.3). 
In the article addressing the private–public mix within the counties (see Chapter 2), a 
basic rational choice model is applied, and, according to Hagen (1995), the demand 
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model is an archetype of rational choice models. In its basic form, the model is, 
however, relatively simple, specifying only that revenues generate expenses. Despite 
its simplicity, the model often provides a very useful starting point when investigating 
also rather complex research questions. In the abovementioned article, the counties 
were assumed to apply a rational, utility maximising strategy and, given the 
contextual horizon they operated within, to decide for the course of action that best 
optimised their gains. Furthermore, the model was expanded to incorporate elements 
documented to be important in similar studies. Features such as the political 
composition of the county council, the size and the age composition of the population 
and factors associated with the settlement pattern were thus included in the model. 
In contrast to the relatively simple demand theoretical framework, the articles 
addressing medical specialists’ decision making and behaviour allow more explicitly 
for inclusion of also non-economic arguments in the models. This is discussed in 
more detail throughout the next section. 
3.3 Integrating work values into medical specialists’ decision-making functions: 
non-economic explanations of physicians’ behaviour and decision making 
Although economic motives for job-related decision making are mentioned frequently 
in the literature, a growing interest in also non-economic explanations has developed 
gradually. While the economic theories have focused traditionally on motivation 
coming from outside of the person (extrinsic motivation), mainstream psychology 
emphasises motivation coming also from within the person (intrinsic motivation) 
(Frey & Jegen, 2001). This latter type of motivation is given special priority in the 
literature addressing work values (e.g., Dose, 1997; Krausz, 1982; Pryor, 1979).  
Frey (1997) emphasised that the combination of psychological and economic 
perspectives facilitates simultaneous inspection of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, 
and thereby makes possible an adjustment of the traditional economic theoretical 
outline. He furthermore described the rationale for combining economic and 
psychological approaches as follows: 
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“Human motivation is not restricted to monetary incentives. In addition to the extrinsic 
motivation induced from outside, intrinsic motivation is also crucially important. People 
do things by intrinsic motivation when they just enjoy doing them, such as playing cards 
with friends the whole night, jogging for miles, climbing high mountains, spending hours 
solving crossword puzzles, contributing anonymously to a charitable organization, or 
working without compensation in a developing country’s hospital. Intrinsic motivation 
goes, however, far beyond such partial examples (…) It is >therefore@ inconceivable that 
people are motivated solely or even mainly by external incentives.” (Frey, 1997: ix) 
Several studies of job-related decision making and behaviour of physicians have 
lately included non-pecuniary characteristics or combined economic and non-
economic explanations in their explanatory models (e.g., Sønbø-Kristiansen, 1996; 
Kankaanranta et al., 2006a; Kankaanranta et al., 2006b; Antonazzo et al., 2003; 
Eisenberg, 1986; Scott, 1997, 1999, 2001; Ubach et al., 2003; Woodward & Warren-
Boulton, 1984; Farley, 1986). For instance, the studies performed by Sønbø-
Kristiansen (1996), Woodward & Warren-Boulton (1984) and Farely (1986) integrate 
arguments based on medical ethics to explain doctors’ behaviour. Similarly, Goodman 
& Wolinsky (1982) investigated how persons with high income in general make 
career decisions that offer greater non-pecuniary rewards than others. 
Since the empirical evidence in the literature supports both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary explanations of job-related behaviour and decision making, another 
question surfaces: Is the relative influence of economic and non-economic factors 
equal across the different sector groups? Within the vocational behaviour literature, 
several studies have found striking differences in the value orientation of individuals 
working in the private and public sectors (e.g., Le Grand & Robinson, 1989; Crewson, 
1997; Brewer et al., 2000; Pratchett & Wingfield, 1996; Ahmed, 1996; Kernaghan, 
2000; Bach, 2000; Nalbandian & Edwards, 1983; Wittmer, 1991). For instance, 
Pratchett & Wingfield (1996) found striking differences between the public sector and 
the other sectors of the economy with regard to the motivation of the persons working 
there. They ascribed the differences mainly to the recruiting of “a homogenous group 
of people that bring with them a set of values and attitudes towards public life (…) 
and who share common values” (Pratchett & Wingfield, 1996: 111). The people 
working in the public sector were consequently assumed to employ a particular set of 
values already before they start working there. This understanding is partially 
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congruent with the understanding communicated by Hall et al. (1970) and Vroom 
(1966), who argued that the selection of an organisational career is deeply embedded 
in some important facets of the person’s identity. Hall et al. suggested, however, that 
the particular career-relevant aspects of the individual’s identity is likely to be 
developed further relative to other parts of the identity when entering the particular 
job, and that a reciprocal exchange between the person’s original values and the 
values encouraged and promoted in the job setting continues as a person’s career 
develops. Hence, the work value literature does not provide any clear-cut, 
unambiguous answers about how work values origin or develop. 
As for the question of sector-related discrepancies in work values, the published 
research literature has overall concluded that the main distinction is between the focus 
on service in the public sector as opposed to profit in the private sector. For instance, 
Pratchett & Wingfield (1996) find that the “not-for-profit” motive is considered the 
hallmark of the public service ethos among those employed in the sector. In a recent 
study, Brewer et al. (2000) provided further support for this view by categorising the 
conceptions of public service providers’ motives into the four categories: “samaritan”, 
“communitarian”, “patriotic” and “humanitarian”. Other studies investigating both 
private and public-sector employees also accentuate the contrast in motivation 
between the two groups (e.g., Crewson, 1997; Wittmer, 1991; Rawls et al., 1975): 
Whereas the public service motivation is described as highly influenced by intrinsic 
values, the private-sector motivation is reported to be characterised by aspects of a 
more extrinsic character. The studies by e.g. Rainey (1982), Baldwin (1987) and 
Gabris & Simo (1995), do, on the other hand, report less clear value- and motivational 
differences between the sectors. 
In the articles of this thesis addressing sector choices (Chapter 3), labour supply 
(Chapter 4) and work time allocation among the medical specialists (Chapter 5), the 
rational choice models are expanded to include also non-economic explanatory 
factors. In the two former articles, the non-economic aspects are represented by a set 
of three work value indices, while other work-related preferences are included in the 
latter article. Although the work value concept has various meanings, the 
understanding of the concept in this thesis is that it represents values of a principal 
and intrinsic character, which are part of the individual’s intrinsic value system. The 
32 
work values are furthermore assumed to be linked to work-related situations and to be 
enduring and stable over time (Midttun, 2007c). Consequently, work values are 
expected to be independent and significant incentives for the medical specialists’ 
decision making and behaviour. 
3.4 Central scientific debates and the private–public puzzle 
Research within the social sciences is often described and categorised according to its 
position within the scientific debate on methodological perspectives and research 
designs. In Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 two such central topics are discussed: the research 
approach (deductive versus inductive) and the methodological perspective 
(individualism versus collectivism), as applied in this dissertation. 
3.4.1 Deductive and inductive research 
Textbooks on scientific research traditions describe two main approaches to 
conducting scientific studies: the deductive and the inductive. The deductive or 
hypothetical deductive method is described as taking a theoretical starting point. 
Based on the initial theory, some empirically testable hypotheses are then derived. 
The theoretical claims are finally compared with the empirical evidence, and the 
results thereby either support or weaken the theory’s position. Conversely, inductive 
research starts out with the empirical observations, and may eventually produce 
theories based on these mappings (e.g., Hellevik, 1991). 
Both deductive and inductive research strategies were employed in the research 
processes behind the development of the four articles constituting the empirical part 
of this dissertation; with the deductive approach dominating. The essays all have a 
deductive build-up, with theoretical roots in for instance demand theory and work 
values theory, and the studies therefore generate new knowledge about the adequacy 
of the theoretical frameworks with reference to the empirical cases illuminated. 
Throughout the research processes, an inductive research strategy did, however, 
supplement the deductive approach. 
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3.4.2 Methodological individualism and collectivism 
One of the most salient divisions within the social sciences is the distinction between 
actor-based and system-based theoretical models.21 Actor-based models (also known 
as micro-level models) build on methodological individualism and focus on the 
person executing the task, the consequences of the actions the person performs and 
the actor’s view of the situation. Researchers applying micro-level models 
furthermore perceive social phenomena, like organisations and institutions, as 
aggregates of the actions taken by individuals. This perspective is fundamental for 
modern neoclassical economics and has Max Weber and Friedrich von Hayek 
amongst its most well-known supporters. 
The system-based theoretical models (also known as macro-level models) build on a 
methodological collectivistic foundation and concentrate on macro-phenomena, such 
as societies and institutions at the higher aggregated levels (Grimen, 2004; Hovi & 
Rasch, 1996). Methodological collectivists furthermore ascribe high significance to 
individuals’ contexts and advocate that both social phenomena and individuals’ 
actions can be explained by social structures and the laws that apply to the social 
systems. Émile Durkheim and Arthur L. Stinchcombe are among the defenders of this 
school of thought. 
In their archetypical forms, the two perspectives are generally incompatible. 
However, their more moderate variants approach each other as the representatives of 
the individualistic perspective recognise the relationships between individuals as 
important influences on actions, and moderates on the collectivist side acknowledge 
society as a construct of social phenomena that cannot be explained solely by other 
social systems, but also by the relationships between individuals. In this manner, the 
more moderate approaches combine elements from both methodological 
individualism and collectivism. 
The approach applied in this thesis has most in common with methodological 
individualism. Although the actors undoubtedly are the main focus in the analyses, the 
21 Hovi & Rasch (1996) argue, however, that there are no strong methodological contradictions 
between methodological individualism and –collectivism. See Hovi & Rasch (1996) for a further 
discussion of the topic. 
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contexts in which they act are, however, expected to impose some restrictions and 
conditions on their behaviour. The most important external aspects are captured either 
by including context-specific variables in the models through applying multilevel 
modelling techniques (see Section 4.1.) or—when the important contextual elements 
are sector specific—through separate modelling of the private, public and mixed sub-
samples. Consequently, predictions about individuals’ decision making and actions 
are performed without marginalising the impact of the environment. 
4. Data material and methods 
The analyses in the articles take a quantitative approach and are based on two 
relatively large data sets; one comprising secondary data collected by Statistics 
Norway and the Norwegian Social Science Data Services, and the other based mainly 
on a survey conducted in April 2005 of 1,270 Norwegian private and public-sector 
working medical specialists. The units of analysis are the counties in the former data 
set, and the individual medical specialists in the latter. A variety of statistical analysis 
techniques is used, and a more thorough account of the specifics of the data material 
and the methods applied are found in the articles. The current section is therefore 
dedicated firstly to the not so well-known multilevel analysis technique applied in the 
articles addressing the sector choices and allocation of work time among the medical 
specialists, and secondly, to some methodological challenges associated with the data 
material and the statistical analyses. 
4.1 Multilevel analysis 
Health service researchers commonly find themselves investigating research problems 
involving data that is nested in hierarchical structures, such as patients admitted to 
hospital departments, which are part of a hospital or health enterprise, or like in the 
survey data obtained from the medical specialists: physicians located in 
municipalities, which are nested in counties, catchment areas and health regions. 
When research problems involve explanatory variables found at multiple analytical 
levels and the variance in the dependent variable is likely to be clustered at higher 
levels, disregarding the possibility of such complex structures may have serious 
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consequences or, in the worst case, lead to incorrect conclusions (cf. Groenewegen, 
1997; Leyland & Groenewegen, 2002; Rice & Leyland, 1996). 
One of the most severe effects stemming from neglecting the possibility of clustering 
at a higher analytical level is the violation of the premise of independence of 
observations and the subsequent assumption that the effective sample size is equal to 
the number of lower-level units. If this assumption turns out to be incorrect, the 
standard errors are underestimated, leading to bias of the t tests and incorrect 
identification of statistically significant outcomes. Multilevel analysis does, however, 
control for this, and facilitates also estimation of random slope models and 
incorporation of cross-level interactions between individual- and context level 
variables. Hence, through allowing one to assess the lower and higher level 
characteristics, and their interactions, simultaneously, multilevel analyses render 
possible dynamic predictions about how processes at different analytical levels 
interact with each other (cf. Groenewegen, 1997; Leyland & Groenewegen, 2002; 
Rice & Leyland, 1996; Hox, 2002). 
In the analyses of the medical specialists’ sector choices (see Chapter 3), the 
likelihood of working privately was found to vary significantly across both individual 
medical specialists and municipalities. After controlling for the degree of centrality of 
the municipality in which the physician was located, the between-municipality 
variation was furthermore reduced by 12 per cent, suggesting that the supply of (and 
possibly also the demand for) private specialised healthcare is peaking within the 
largest cities.22 This finding thus coincides with the observations of Kankaanranta et 
al. (2006a) in Finland. The random part of the model further revealed that one of the 
individual level variables’ coefficients (political affiliation) varied significantly across 
the municipalities. The more substantial implications of the results are consequently 
that macro-level aspects affect how attractive and feasible a private-sector choice is 
for the individual medical specialist, and that characteristics of both the individual 
doctor and the environment in which he or she lives influences the propensity of 
working in the private sector. In the article addressing the working time allocation of 
medical specialists (see Chapter 5), multilevel modelling allowed for the combination 
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of physician-specific and catchment area (demand)-specific explanations in the same 
model.23 However, the results indicated that the demand-side contributions were only 
marginal. Nevertheless, some interesting results concerning the GP rates were 
obtained. 
Generally, job-related decisions, like sector choices and working time allocation, are 
often complex. This should be reflected also in the choice of explanatory model when 
investigating job-related behaviour, and conglomerates of explanations at different 
analytical levels should therefore be applied in the analyses. 
4.2 Methodological challenges 
Although the empirical part of the dissertation undoubtedly generates robust results 
and new knowledge about the private specialised healthcare services in Norway, some 
methodological reservations should be made when interpreting the outcomes. 
First, the survey data, which constitute the empirical basis for three of the articles, has 
a response rate of 53 per cent. Even though this may seem low if compared to regular 
social scientific studies, the rate is actually quite high for a large sample postal survey 
conducted among physicians (cf. Cummings et al., 2001). Due to the aim of full 
anonymity for the respondents, additional information about the non-respondents is, 
however, lacking. Inspections of national statistics—for the variables where this was 
available—indicated that there hardly were any discrepancies between the sampled 
data and the national trends. Nevertheless, with regard to the dimensions for which we 
did not have information about the total population of physicians (e.g., the work value 
variables) there is some uncertainty regarding how the positions of the non-responders 
relate to the equivalent positions of the responders. 
Second, as highlighted in the previous section, multilevel analyses are particularly 
well suited for analyses of health related research questions. Yet such analyses are 
22 For a more general description of the geographic distribution of physicians in Norway, see Brenne 
(2006). 
23 In addition, different working time restrictions within the private and the public sectors could have 
been controlled for by including the sector as a second level in the analyses. In this particular study, 
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only performed in two of the articles. As regards the third article based on the same 
empirical material, multilevel analyses would have been applied if the specialists’ 
institutional affiliation had been known. 
Third, employing cross-sectional data makes dynamic analyses of causal relationships 
sometimes rather troublesome. A number of studies have, e.g., documented that 
individuals may adjust their values pragmatically in order to shrink the gaps between 
their values and their behaviour (e.g., Vroom, 1966, 1995), and particularly within the 
field of economy the relevancy of variables representing values for prediction of 
behaviour has been questioned. The issue is, however, part of on ongoing debate 
between the psychology and economy communities. In order to cope with this 
challenge in the studies employing survey data, pre-validated work value measures 
were employed where available (cf. Midttun, 2007a, 2007c), and all 
operationalisations of questions in the work value battery were performed to best 
capture values of a principal and intrinsic character, which, according to the literature, 
are part of the individual’s intrinsic value system and enduring and stable over time 
(e.g., Dose, 1997; Rosenberg, 1957). The values are therefore assumed to predate the 
observed behaviour. Nevertheless, the reader should be aware that decision-making 
behaviour and values may influence each other in a reciprocal manner. 
With regard to the generality of the conclusions reached, the findings are of course 
not unconditionally valid across time and space. As regards the time element, the 
medical profession is subject to constant development, both as a result of the need to 
ever so often adjust and adopt to reorganisations, restructuring and reforms, and due 
to the steadily licensing and integration of new doctors into the profession. Besides, 
the technological and research-based developments within the field of medicine 
require dynamic and progressive changes and responses. Hence, the results 
established in the current studies may not be possible to generalise neither a decade 
forward nor a decade back in time. As for the ability to generalise the findings beyond 
the Norwegian case, the available research from the other Scandinavian counties—
although scarce—gives some indications of largely congruent patterns of healthcare 
organising. The outcomes from private–public analyses are thus likely to be relatively 
separate sector-specific analyses with catchment areas as level two were however better fit for 
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similar across the boarders. With regard to the other NHS systems, the fundamental 
organising principles do, however, deviate too much to allow for comprehensive 
generalisations without taking major reservations. Likewise, more general 
implications about the behaviour and actions of members of other professions (both 
within and outside of the medical arena) cannot unconditionally be drawn on the basis 
of the findings for the medical specialists. For instance, at least within the Norwegian 
context, managing physicians has been described as relatively challenging, and 
perhaps not even appropriate, a recognition naturally setting this group apart from 
most other professional groups which are otherwise comparable (Piene, 2003). 
Furthermore, the partial privatisation of the healthcare segment of public service 
delivery represents not only an introduction of a market orientation within the single 
largest public expenditure area within the former county administration, but also an 
attempt to partially privatise a segment which is very unique when it comes to the 
services produced (healthcare) and the consumers/users of the services (patients and 
their relatives). The manner in which the adjustments has taken place, and the 
empirical evidence provided via the current studies, is therefore highly unlikely to be 
representative of the changes that have taken place within other divisions of the non-
healthcare parts of public sector’s service system. 
5. Summary of the essays 
The four essays included in the dissertation address different aspects of the private 
element of Norwegian specialised healthcare. The empirical contents are divided into 
three main segments: first, the increase in, and geographical distribution of, private 
healthcare suppliers (see 5.1); second, physicians’ choices of work between private 
and public sectors (see 5.2); and third, the differences in physicians’ supply of labour 
across and within the sectors (see Sections 5.3 and 5.4). 
5.1 The private–public mix of healthcare: evidence from a decentralised NHS 
country 
As outlined in the review of the existing literature, few studies have analysed 
empirical data on the Norwegian private–public mix of healthcare (see Section 1). 
investigating the research problems. 
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Knowing that the private healthcare supply is distributed very unevenly 
geographically the question about which factors affect the allocation becomes 
particularly interesting. The purpose of this paper is therefore to explain the 
geographic differences in the private–public mix of specialised healthcare by using 
data from the Norwegian counties over a period of 11 years (1991–2001). The effects 
of economic, socio-economic, political and structural factors on the number of public 
medical specialists per 100,000 inhabitants; the number of private contract specialists 
per 100,000 inhabitants; and the private–public mix (defined as the number of private 
contract specialists as a proportion of the total number of medical specialists) are 
analysed. 
The starting point of the study is the observation that privatisation of public services is 
often driven by economic scarcity and changes in political leadership. The study used 
a demand theoretical framework to investigate the differences between counties and 
over time. In line with most international studies on the topic (e.g., van Doorslaer et 
al., 2004; Freed et al., 2004; Krishnan, 1992; Elesh & Schollaert, 1972; Dionne et al., 
1987; Benham et al., 1968; Reskin & Campbell, 1974), a classical aggregated 
research design was applied. 
Striking deviations in effects were found depending on which output parameter was 
considered. Although revenues were important for all three measures, the direction of 
the effect varied. Consistent with the initial expectation, high revenues increased the 
supply of public specialists, whereas low revenues forced the counties to be 
innovative and to use the private supply of services. Demographic aspects were most 
important in explaining the differences in the public supply of specialists, and the 
proportion of elderly individuals in the population had for instance a positive effect on 
the public supply rate. Neither population size nor individual income had any major 
effects. Given the universal, tax-based service provision within the Norwegian 
healthcare model, the lack of effects for the latter variable was, however, not 
surprising. The variable representing the political composition of the county councils 
(operationalised as the share of the representatives coming from a conservative party) 
impacted positively on the share of private specialists, whereas no corresponding 
effect was found for the two other dependent variables. Among the structural 
variables (population density, number of GPs per 1,000 inhabitants and presence of a 
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university hospital within the county), all results were consistent with the initial 
expectations. 
The results revealed that the factors explaining geographic differences in healthcare 
supply had highly sector-dependent effects. Both economic scarcity and political 
leadership were furthermore found to be important to the private rates and proportions 
of specialists. With some minor exceptions, the findings of the study thus 
corresponded to the evidence in the international literature, and the few discrepancies 
resulted mainly from characteristics typical of the Norwegian healthcare model. 
5.2 Private or public? An empirical analysis of the importance of work values 
for work sector choice among Norwegian medical specialists 
Both the international and the Norwegian research literature on sector choices have 
been characterised by scarcity, and only a few studies have hitherto addressed the 
issue in a direct manner (e.g., Kankaanranta et al., 2006b; Blank, 1985). In 1995 
Vroom described the research on sector choices in the following manner: 
“Although a great deal of research has been conducted on the occupational choice 
process, comparatively little attention has been directed to factors affecting people’s 
choices among organizations (…) We remain pretty much in the dark concerning the 
variables affecting people’s decisions to work for the government, private industry, 
educational institutions, hospitals, or social agencies.” (Vroom, 1995: 59) 
Since then, little has been done to meet the demand for research. The current study 
addresses individual and context-related influences on the private versus public-sector 
choices of Norwegian medical specialists. 
In the aftermath of the 2002 hospital reform, the private supply of specialised 
healthcare increased substantially and offered more Norwegian medical specialists the 
opportunity to work part- or full-time in the private sector. This also actualised the 
question of which factors guide sector choice decisions. Building on work values 
theory, the influence of non-pecuniary characteristics, which are often overlooked 
within the dominating labour economics literature, are highlighted. According to 
Judge & Bretz (1992), work values are representative of enduring values of a 
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principal and intrinsic character that individuals hold and apply to work settings. 
Factor analysis was performed to trace the patters in the medical specialists’ responses 
to a battery of work value questions. Three categories were, as a result, singled out, 
and indices representing professional, payment and benefit, and autonomy values 
were derived. Both the likelihood of working in the private sector at all and the 
propensity for working full-time in the private sector were analysed. The distribution 
of variations in sector choices between the individual and location (municipality) 
levels was investigated via multilevel analysis. 
The empirical analyses revealed that high valuation of autonomy in the work situation 
impacted positively on the likelihood of working in the private sector, whereas high 
appreciation of professional values had the opposite effect. In medical specialists 
working part- or full-time in the private sector, positive assessment of professional 
and payment and benefit values was strongly associated with combining private and 
public jobs rather than working full-time privately. Consequently, the sector choices 
were found to be strongly influenced by the medical specialists’ work values. Further, 
also the physician’s geographic context was established as important for the sector 
choice decisions. Although the question of causality between centrality and sector 
choice could not be answered completely on the basis of the available data, the degree 
of centrality within the physician’s residential area (population density and 
geographic position in relation to a centre where a higher order of central functions is 
located) was found to be influential. This finding can furthermore be seen in 
conjunction with the different healthcare market situations within the urban and the 
more rural areas and the ability to attract private medical specialists within these 
areas. Hence, both individual and macro-level factors were documented to be 
important for the predicting of medical specialists’ sector choices. Consequently, the 
job-related decisions medical specialists make are relatively complex, and future 
research should take this into account when choosing explanatory models and 
analytical approaches. 
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5.3 Labour supply among medical specialists in private and public sector: 
Pecuniary and non-pecuniary explanations
Several studies have compared the motivation and job-related behaviour of people 
working in the private and the public sectors and found substantial sector-dependent 
differences. By and large, the documented dissimilarities mirror a high preoccupation 
with monetary incentives among employees in the private sector, whereas their 
public-sector counterparts tend to be more inspired by non-pecuniary motives and 
impetuses. However, a brief review of the voluminous labour supply literature reveals 
that pecuniary explanations have dominated, while non-pecuniary aspects have been 
given limited attention. In the current study, both economic and non-economic 
explanations of physicians’ behaviour are incorporated, and data on the private and 
public-sector working medical specialists are analysed separately. 
Labour supply is measured as the physicians’ mean number of weekly work hours, 
and the model initially follows standard labour economics. Consequently, measures of 
income, non-labour income and individual characteristics are incorporated in the 
utility function. The new contribution to the model is a vector representing the work 
values. The results suggest that both pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects are 
important and that the outcomes for physicians working solely in either the private or 
the public sector are largely coinciding. Contrary to the results for these two groups, 
the estimates for physicians combining work in both sectors (the mixed sector group) 
indicated that valuation of payment and benefit factors was positively associated with 
the number of hours worked per week. These results thereby suggest that the effects 
of work values vary primarily according to whether the medical specialists hold one 
or multiple jobs. In line with the conclusions drawn by Smith Conway & Kimmel 
(1998) and Shisko & Rostker (1976), combining jobs thus seems to allow for an 
adjustment of the labour supply that optimises the outcomes of materialistic benefits.  
The overall conclusion of the study is that the traditional labour economics models 
may benefit from integrating both the private–public dimension and non-pecuniary 
measures into the analytical framework. 
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5.4 Medical specialists’ allocation of working time 
The international literature provides important knowledge about how the time 
allocation of GPs and medical specialists relate to aspects such as type of 
reimbursement system, patient demand and supply characteristics (e.g., Groenewegen 
et al., 1992; de Jong et al., 2006; Groenewegen & Hutten, 1995; Freiman & Marder, 
1984; Mechanic, 1975; Calnan et al., 1992). In Norway, research on this topic is scant 
and limited mainly to descriptive studies. Knowing that the Norwegian healthcare 
system is characterised by a relatively low input of physician work hours combined 
with a high quality of the services provided (Sæther, 2005a; Midttun, 2007a; OECD, 
2006; Norwegian Official Report, 1997; van den Noord et al., 1998), it is however 
likely that one possible key to this highly desirable balance is to be found in the 
organisation and allocation of physicians’ working time. Thus, the central research 
question within this article was how Norwegian medical specialists allocate their 
working time, described as the relative time spent on patient work and administrative 
work, and the likelihood of allocating time to research/educational tasks. A model 
incorporating four sets of explanatory variables—internal organising of work, wage 
incentives, personal preferences and demand factors in the population—was used to 
investigate the question. Some of the values of the variables coincide broadly with the 
private–public divide in Norwegian healthcare. 
One of the main results of the analyses was that physicians working in the private 
sector and physicians combining private and public-sector work spend relatively more 
time on patient assignments than publicly employed physicians do. Public physicians, 
on the other hand, allocate more time to administrative and research/educational tasks. 
This finding thereby supports the proposition that work time allocations mirror the 
differences in on-call commitments, wage incentives and the division of labour 
between the sectors. Moreover, also other aspects associated with the internal 
organising of work and the physicians’ preferences exerted highly significant effects 
on the dependent variables across the sectors. The demand-specific set of variables, 
on the other hand, contributed only moderately to the explanation of work time 
allocations. 
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The introduction of the European Union’s (EU) Working Time Directive has led 
many European healthcare administrators and healthcare politicians to be faced with 
the challenge of rescheduling the work shift system while also having to ensure 
specialised emergency arrangements and the quality of the services. Based on the 
Norwegian experience, it seems that public, tax-based healthcare systems obtain some 
increase in the overall share of the working time spent on patient-related assignments 
if outsourcing some closely specified work tasks to the private sector. However, some 
reservations should be made with regards to how the division of labour between the 
private and the public sectors is to begin with and how the overall private–public mix 
within the system is. It is for instance likely that the marginal effect of increasing the 
private provision of healthcare services in systems that already have a widespread 
private supply differs quite substantially from the effects obtained in mainly public 
healthcare systems, like Norway.  
Future European studies on allocation of physician working time should pay special 
attention to the private–public dimension as this parameter is likely to influence how 
physicians’ work is organised, which payment incentives prevail and how the demand 
for specialised healthcare services in the population is addressed. 
6. Discussion 
Overall, four main conclusions can be drawn from the empirical studies: 
x At the aggregated (county) level, there are striking differences in the 
effects of the explanatory factors representing revenues, demographic 
aspects and political features according to whether the public or the private 
supply of specialised healthcare is considered. This finding can be seen in 
conjunction with the discovery that the centrality (urban versus rural 
location) of the area in which the medical specialist lives influences the 
choice of work sector. 
x Contextual variables are important for sector choices and for allocation of 
working time. 
x Work values are important for medical specialists’ sector choices and to 
some extent for determining the amount of time they spend working each 
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week. As regards the association between work values and labour supply, 
differences were detected between the group of physicians combining 
private and public sector jobs and the two other groups (physicians 
working solely in one of the sectors).  
x Relatively salient dissimilarities in the allocation of working time were 
found depending on which sector the medical specialist was affiliated 
with. 
The main implications of these findings are four-fold. First, the studies document that 
economic explanations may contribute significantly to the understanding of 
geographic differences in private–public mixes. However, when dealing with the 
complex motivational patterns, job-related decision making and behaviour of highly 
dedicated physicians, these explanations are insufficient if not combined with 
additional approaches and perspectives. This conclusion is also supported by the 
existing literature on physicians and other high-income professionals, which reports 
only weak effects of economic variables on job-related outputs, such as labour supply 
(e.g., Sæther, 2005b; Sloan, 1974; Goodman & Wolinsky, 1982). 
Second, the contextual effects should not be disregarded as both the analysis of the 
counties’ private–public mixes and the analysis of the individual physicians’ sector 
choices point to the higher rates of private specialists and higher likelihood of private-
sector choices in the central, most densely populated areas where the number of 
potential private patients is also likely to be higher. 
Third, as outlined above, the geographic distribution of private contract specialists 
was unequal throughout the 1991–2001 period. If private specialists provide services 
that are perfect substitutes for outpatient services offered at public hospitals, this 
accumulation of private practices in only a few geographic areas may simply reflect 
compensation for correspondingly lower rates of public supply in that area. If, on the 
other hand, private healthcare services represent something genuinely different from 
the public hospital services, or the private institutions mostly are located in the same 
areas as the university hospitals (which currently seems to be the case), this 
geographically skewed distribution has important health political implications. For the 
patients, the geographic dissimilarities in accessibility signify a breach of the principal 
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health political aim of equal supply and provision of healthcare services regardless of 
the patient’s place of residence (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 2001; Iversen 
& Kopperud, 2002). For the physicians, the uneven distributions—both in terms of 
the geographic allocation and the distribution of contracts between the different 
medical specialities—may have important consequences for their career-related 
opportunities and freedom of choice.24 From the central government’s point of view, 
these patterns may well reflect a trade-off between the goal of equality in access to 
healthcare and efficiency concerns. 
Forth, the findings establish that sector affiliation does matter. Although physicians in 
the private and public sector do not always behave differently, their work time 
allocations and labour supply deviated somewhat across the different sectors. The 
results thereby suggest that the recent upswing in the private supply of healthcare 
services may mark the start of a new trend in the provision of specialised healthcare in 
Norway. Valuable new knowledge may therefore be gained by incorporating the 
private–public dimension into the traditional explanatory models applied within 
health services research. 
In addition to the implications mentioned above, Øvretveit (2001) outlines four more 
general implications of the increased private representation, which may be relevant 
for the Nordic governments. First, is the need for the governments to gather more 
reliable information about the private sector in order to make better-informed 
decisions. Second, is the importance of clarifying the governments’ policies towards 
the different types of private-sector financing and provision. Third, Øvretveit calls for 
a review of the current regulations regarding private healthcare, and finally he 
accentuates the governments’ need to learn from their neighbouring countries’ 
experiences in the field of private healthcare. For a more extensive discussion of these 
and similar implications, consult Øvretveit (2001). 
In light of the ongoing health political debate over private versus public delivery of 
healthcare services, the implications cited above should encourage more research on 
these issues. Some main points from the debate are briefly discussed in Section 6.1. 
24 For a more detailed outline of policies affecting the geographical distribution of physicians, see 
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6.1 Suggestions for future research 
Public healthcare provision is still dominating the Scandinavian healthcare scene, and 
at least in Norway, the political climate suggests that this will continue to be the case 
also in the immediate future. However, the Scandinavian model does not exist in a 
vacuum, and international trends—inspired by NPM and privatisation—are therefore 
likely to remain influential also in the years to come.  
The past decade’s change in the private–public mix has induced a high demand for 
knowledge on this topic (e.g., Øvretveit, 2001, 2003; Midttun & Hagen, 2006), and 
for healthcare politicians and healthcare administrators it should be imperative to 
know more about the differences between the private and the public sectors. Relevant 
questions in this regard are: What can be expected when embarking privatisation 
strategies? What facilitates and what impedes private and public healthcare providers’ 
abilities to do the jobs that the healthcare politicians and –administrators expect them 
to do? Are there areas in which both the public and the private providers could benefit 
from supplementing each other? In which areas do the physicians working in the 
private and the public sectors behave similarly and differerently? From a theoretical 
point of view, it would furthermore be interesting to know what other approaches, 
such as the profession-theoretical and the transaction cost economic ones, would add 
to the debate about these questions. 
Future research on the Norwegian case should also investigate deeper the privatisation 
that already has taken place. Given the strong position of the public authorities in the 
contractual relationship and the gradual development of very detailed terms and 
conditions in the contract documents, it may be timely to discuss whether the private 
contractors represent something other than simply an extension of the public 
hospitals’ elective or out-patient departments during the limited time for which the 
contracts apply. If the public authorities’ dominance is too strong, the efficiency gains 
and clarification of responsibilities that the privatisation efforts were supposed to 
bring about may turn out to be only minor or may simply not appear at all. Building 
on the results from reflections on these issues, healthcare politicians may want to 
Simoens & Hurst (2006). 
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debate more extensively what they primarily seek to obtain by contracting with 
private suppliers, and which role the central and regional health authorities should 
take in order to attain the specified goals. Consequently, there is a pressing need to 
explore what the differences between the private and the public sectors imply for the 
various healthcare outputs and the general goal achievement within the Norwegian 
NHS. 
This dissertation has shown clearly that there still is a need for research on the 
private–public mix of healthcare. The past decade’s increase in the private supply of 
healthcare services has furthermore put new questions about the private–public divide 
on the political agenda. The all-party support for private healthcare—in the 
comprehensive effort to reduce waiting times for treatment and occupation rates at 
public hospitals at the turn of the millennium—seems to be withering away as the 
goals are now within reach. Consequently, the future division of labour between the 
private and the public sectors is likely to become the target of continuous political 
debate, and a policy area in which the political parties may take the opportunity to 
distance themselves from their political opponents. As a result, the political debate on 
the private–public puzzle in Norwegian healthcare is about to consolidate as one of 
today’s most important political issues, and the political tug of war on the topic is 
therefore likely to affect physicians, patients, as well as the public at large, also in the 
years to come. 
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Appendix
A 1 The Norwegian healthcare system — in context and detail 
Healthcare systems are normally categorised according to the organisation of the 
financing and provision of services. Although several typologies are available (e.g., 
Besley & Gouveia, 1994, Propper & Green, 1999; Roemer, 1985; Chernichovsky, 
2000; Donaldson et al., 2005), healthcare systems in Western European countries are 
usually categorised as either a Bismarck-style or a Beveridge-style system (e.g., 
Saltman & Figueras, 1998; Roemer, 1984). Occasionally, some systems may be 
classified as mixed (e.g., France, Greece, Ireland and Portugal), but Table A1 
categorises these countries according to which of the two main system styles their 
system resembles the most.25
Healthcare system Main financing type Examples of countries 
Bismarck style SHI Austria, Belgium, Germany, The 
Netherlands, Switzerland, France, 
Luxembourg, Hungary 
Beveridge style Taxes UK, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, 
Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain 
Table A1: Classification of healthcare systems (Source: Saltman & Figueras, 1998).
The origin of the Bismarck-style funding model can be traced back to the 19th century 
Germany ruled under Bismarck. At first, health insurance was established to cover 
only low-income workers and was financed partially by contributions from the 
employer (one-third) and partially by premiums paid by the employees (two-thirds) 
(Marrée & Groenewegen, 1997). Gradually, this SHI-based system was expanded to 
become a statutory arrangement covering the entire population, and slowly the health 
insurance part became equally important as the protection against loss of income 
because of illness. At the same time, the role of the central government changed from 
merely passive towards taking a more active role. In the beginning, the administration 
of the sickness funds took place at arm’s length from the government, but with time 
25 In fact, Williams (1990) argues that all countries have mixed systems (either the system is 
predominantly public with smaller private systems operating alongside the public organisations, or the 
system is predominantly private with smaller public systems that care for those who cannot afford 
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the strategy became increasingly intervening (Marrée & Groenewegen, 1997). For 
instance, to contain costs and maintain equity, government could put a ceiling on the 
insurance premiums (Saltman & Figueras, 1998). 
Today, the insurances in SHI systems are funded mainly through state subsidy, 
employer payments (compulsory payroll contributions) and contributions from 
employees (premiums)26, and premiums are usually collected directly by sickness 
funds/central state-run funds (Saltman et al., 2004). The funds enter collective 
contracts with providers of healthcare to guarantee a stable supply of the necessary 
services. However, the countries have chosen somewhat different solutions with 
regards to the organising of the provision. For instance, in Germany and The 
Netherlands, relatively wealthy persons may choose, or are required to, opt out from 
the public system and buy private health insurance. Moreover, during the 1990s, most 
SHI systems were restructured comprehensively as they became subject to several 
government-initiated reforms. Two of the main intentions of these reforms were to 
introduce more freedom of choice for the insured and to induce more competition 
between the insurance funds (Saltman et al., 2004). The latter effort was expected to 
spur improvements in efficiency and quality in the provision of healthcare (Saltman et 
al., 2004), and, as part of this new focus on competition, the degree of risk bearing for 
the individual funds was naturally increased. Simultaneously, complex mechanisms 
were introduced to adjust the revenues available for each fund.27
The Beveridge-style system originated in the UK in 1948 with the establishment of 
the NHS. The centralised and state-subsidised NHS was founded in response to the 
proposals of the Beveridge report, and this report’s name was therefore to refer to 
state-funded healthcare systems with universal provision of services in the years to 
come (Marrée & Groenewegen, 1997). Beveridge-style systems are furthermore 
known particularly for their equitable geographic distribution of resources, their 
mainly tax-based funding and for relying heavily on public provision of services 
private care) and that only the relative size of the two sectors and the division of work between them 
vary.  
26 The premiums paid are typically linked to the income of the member and commonly defined as a 
percentage of the person’s wage (Saltman et al., 2004). 
27 For a more thorough description of SHI-based healthcare systems and the reforms introduced during 
the 1990s, see e.g. Saltman et al. (2004). 
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(Saltman & Figueras, 1998). Moreover, the hospital facilities are predominantly state 
owned and the physicians working there salaried. 
The Scandinavian welfare state model is in a way “a model within the Beveridge 
model” with its distinct focus on the state and the public sector, or as Kuhnle (2000: 
386) put it:28
“(…) the Scandinavian (or more precisely the ‘Nordic’) welfare states share a number of 
common characteristics, such that researchers tend to group them into one specific 
category of ‘welfare regime’ (Esping-Andersen 1990), ‘model’ (Leibfried 1993), ‘family 
of nations’ (Castles 1993), or ‘type of welfare state’.” (Ferrera, 1997; Kuhnle & Alestalo, 
2000) 
Although the healthcare system in the Scandinavian countries is similar to systems in 
other countries that have adopted the Beveridge model, the Scandinavian countries 
have taken the role of the state as a welfare provider a step further. First, central 
government has a very predominant role in both the formation and implementation of 
welfare policies. The public sector and the state are therefore involved in financing 
and organising of the welfare benefits to a far greater extent than in most other 
European countries (Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002). Second, the 
higher proportion of government employment in the Scandinavian countries than in 
Continental Europe is exceptional. For example, in 1995, the rest of Western Europe 
had a government employment rate equal to 18.8 per cent, while the corresponding 
figure for the Nordic countries was no less than 29.4 per cent (Kuhnle, 2000). Third, 
the Scandinavian countries practice an absolute and invariable form of universalism in 
the provision of healthcare services and guarantee all citizens free access to care if ill. 
The equitability principle, which is strongly related to the principle of universalism, is 
practised equally absolutely and is to ensure that services are allocated according to 
needs, irrespective of wealth, social status or geographic location. The combination of 
strong focus on the goals of universalism and equitability, together with the strong 
role of the state, has furthermore imposed a relatively heavy tax burden on the 
respective nations’ populations and has contributed to a significant financial 
redistribution effect. Compared with other Western European countries, relatively 
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egalitarian-styled societies have therefore developed in the Scandinavian countries. 
Forth, the Scandinavian countries all have a strong tradition of decentralisation of the 
welfare state’s responsibilities to local county or municipality institutions. 
As one of the countries embracing the Scandinavian welfare state model, Norway 
subscribes to the “Scandinavian way” of organising, financing and providing social 
services. The next paragraphs discuss the historical and current organisation of 
Norwegian healthcare services, with special attention on the fourth aspect mentioned 
above: decentralisation of responsibility. 
A.1.1 The Norwegian healthcare system before the 2002 hospital reform: a 
decentralised model 
Decentralisation may take many forms and may be defined according to a range of 
theoretical dimensions (e.g., Saltman & Bankauskaite, 2006; Pollitt et al., 1998; Bach, 
2000). According to Saltman et al. (2006), a widely accepted definition of 
decentralisation is “the transfer of authority and power in public planning, 
management and decision making from higher to lower levels of government or 
typically from national to subnational levels” (Saltman et al., 2006: 2). Magnussen et 
al. (2006) used the term in a similar manner and, in reference to Oates (1999), stated 
that decentralisation implies a shift in the financial or political power from a central to 
a less central institution, and that this process is commonly defended on the grounds 
of fiscal federalism, which promotes local production of public goods that are to be 
consumed locally. Saltman et al. (2006) and Saltman & Figueras (1998) introduced an 
even more refined definition of the concept, which, although building on the similar 
principles as the two abovementioned definitions, incorporates privatisation as a 
separate form of decentralisation. According to this definition, privatisation can be 
seen as a process where the government transfers functions to a private company, 
organisation or other unit. The encouragement of competition and focus on the 
costumer or client that follows from the privatisation is furthermore expected to 
ensure and strengthen the consumers’ voice and position. 
28 For more information about the respective Scandinavian countries’ healthcare profiles, consult e.g. 
Glenngård et al. (2005), Vallgårda et al. (2001), Järvelin (2002) or Johansen (2006). 
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Inspired by Saltman & Bankauskaite (2006), the Norwegian NHS has been analysed 
along three dimensions of decentralisation—political, administrative and fiscal—
before and after the hospital reform.29
As noted introductorily, the Norwegian healthcare system is often described as 
decentralised. Because the ownership of the Norwegian somatic hospitals was 
distributed between the municipalities, central government, private non-profit 
organisations and the counties before 1970, strong local autonomy was established 
early on. The significant element of political decentralisation continued after the 
Hospital Act of 1970, when the counties formally took over principal responsibility 
for the hospitals.30 The central argument justifying the Hospital Act was that 
democratic values would be best ensured under locally elected control and that the 
ability to make local adjustments would generate more equal accessibility to 
healthcare services, more efficient resource allocation and, eventually, lead to better 
fulfilment of the local population’s needs (Vareide, 2001). Although the counties 
were formally in charge of the hospitals from 1970 to 2002, the central government 
did, in practice, often intervene in the control. For instance, partial ABF and free 
hospital choice for patients were introduced by central government in 1997 and 2001, 
respectively (see Section A.1.2 for a more detailed outline of the two arrangements). 
The degree of political decentralisation in the period before 2002 was consequently 
shifting, and signs of political centralisation were present during the later years of the 
period. 
The degree of administrative decentralisation in the Norwegian healthcare system 
throughout the period should largely be seen in conjunction with the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation. From 1980 to 1997, some of the primary administrative 
responsibilities were namely associated with the distribution of the annual block 
grants and with the prioritisation decisions concerning patient treatment. These 
responsibilities were often delegated from the county politicians to hospital managers 
and hospital physicians, who, as a result, enjoyed relatively significant room to 
exercise discretion. Through the last decade with county ownership of the hospitals 
29 Saltman & Bankauskaite’s typology is based on Wolman (1990). For a more extensive elaboration of 
the decentralisation concepts, consult Saltman & Bankauskaite (2006). 
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the administrative procedures were, however, gradually centralised, and a top-down 
relationship based on command and control became more and more predominant. 
Moreover, the introduction of ABF and legislation granting patients more rights 
contributed heavily to the curtailment of the local public servants’ autonomy. 
As noted earlier, the degree of fiscal decentralisation has been shifting. From 1970 to 
1980, hospital funding was based on an arrangement where the hospitals were 
reimbursed by the NIS for 75 per cent of their expenses. The reimbursements (fixed 
grants) were based on estimated costs per bed-day (Nerland, 2001). In 1980, a more 
decentralised arrangement was introduced that gave block grants to the counties based 
on criteria such as demographic aspects (Saltman & Figueras, 1997). Although the 
block grants improved the central cost control, the new fiscal arrangement first and 
foremost represented a decentralisation, and the counties were now assigned the 
overall responsibility for distributing resources between the various tasks. During the 
1990s, however, central government’s dissatisfaction with the block grant system 
resulted in a centralisation of the financing system, and eventually the introduction of 
partial ABF financing. 
A.1.2 Radical challenges within the NHS: moving towards a semi-centralised 
model 
The predominant role of the counties continued during the 1990s, but healthcare 
politicians and hospital administrators were faced with increasing challenges as the 
demand for specialised healthcare grew and the supply of services could not keep 
pace. Throughout this period, the waiting lists and waiting times for elective treatment 
accelerated, and the hospitals’ budget deficits peaked. In response to criticism by the 
political opposition in the Parliament (the Storting), the media and, gradually, the 
public at large, a set of overarching legal and structural changes were therefore 
initiated. Among these was the introduction of a priority system, which, by 1990, 
developed into a guarantee arrangement for wait-listed patients (Norwegian Official 
30 During the seven years from 1963 to 1970 as many as 44 somatic hospitals were transferred from full 
or partial local municipality ownership to county ownership.  
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Report, 1987).31 Later on, this arrangement was replaced by the “right to necessary 
healthcare” (cf. Ministry of Health, 2003). 
Patients’ rights were in general placed high on the political agenda, and one of the 
contributions to improve these rights was the introduction of the free hospital choice 
arrangement in 2001. At the onset, however, this arrangement was not discussed as a 
means of empowering patients, but was instead seen as a measure to remedy the 
hospitals’ problems with long waiting times for treatment. Following a successful 
experiment with the arrangement in two health regions during 1994–1996, the process 
was implemented that lead to the final nationwide introduction of the Patient Rights 
Act, of which free hospital choice was a part (Vrangbæk & Østergren, 2006). Finally, 
the introduction of the free hospital choice arrangement in 2001 meant that all patients 
waiting for elective treatment were given the opportunity to choose for themselves 
which hospital to be admitted to.32
The financing system was also centre of much political debate. From 1980 to 1997, 
the financing of somatic hospitals was based on prospective budgeting and block 
grants distributed by the counties — a system incorporating few incentives for 
efficiency improvements. The length of the waiting lists was therefore occasionally 
used as an argument for demanding increased grants in the following budget period 
(e.g., Iversen, 1993; Carlsen, 1994). Because of inadequacies like this, the financing 
system gradually became the target of considerable criticism. Finally, throughout the 
1990s, the prioritisation and efficiency debate resulted in an initiative to alter the 
financing system entirely (e.g., Stortingsmelding nr. 44 (1995–1996);
Stortingsmelding nr. 24 (1996–1997)). The result was the implementation of a 
service-based payment system, ABF, in 1997, whose main function was to increase 
the activity and efficiency within the hospitals. From July 1997, a fraction of the 
31 The guaranty was issued to elective patients who were defined as in need of specialised healthcare 
services, and the necessary treatment was guaranteed to be provided to the patient within six months. 
As the years went by, the issued guarantees were, however, frequently broken, and in 1995 10 per cent 
of the issued guarantees was reported to be breached. 
32 In December 2003, the Parliament (the Storting) amended the Patient Rights Act and further 
strengthened the patient’s freedom of choice (Ministry of Health, 2003). Henceforth, private for-profit 
hospitals holding contracts with an RHA were included in the pool of institutions from which the 
patients could choose. According to Saltman & Figueras (1997) and Møller Pedersen (2005), the 
increased focus on patients’ rights and, in particular, the right to choose care providers was part of a 
European and Scandinavian (NPM) trend at the time. 
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block grant was thus replaced by an activity-based reimbursement, where the size of 
the compensation was dependent upon the DRG category of each patient admission. 
The share of the finances channelled through ABF varied from 30 to 60 per cent 
during the subsequent years. 
Parallel with the changes in the financing model, more profound changes comprising 
the entire model of organising was in offing. Politicians and the public were asking 
whether the healthcare system had developed into a massive game between hospitals, 
county politicians and the central government. Finally, in January 2002, the 
difficulties associated with the unclear distribution of responsibilities culminated in 
the implementation of the hospital reform. The process is described as follows by 
Hagen & Kaarbøe (2006): 
“This reform process represents the latest attempt by the central government to resolve 
what are viewed as major problems in the Norwegian health care system: namely long 
waiting lists for elective treatment, lack of equity in the supply of hospital services, and a 
lack of financial responsibility and transparency that led to a blaming game between the 
counties, as the former owners and the central government.” (Hagen & Kaarbøe, 2006: 
320) 
A.1.3 The post-reform Norwegian NHS: centralisation and reorientation 
By Norwegian standards, the hospital reform, which encompassed 100,000 employees 
and 40 billion Norwegian Kroner, is one of the most comprehensive public 
reorganisations that have ever taken place (Martinussen & Paulsen, 2004). The reform 
incorporated two main elements: Ownership of the hospitals was transferred from the 
counties to the central government, and the hospitals were to be operated as health 
enterprises (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 2001). Hence, the hospitals were 
incorporated into five RHAs, and each health region was made responsible for the 
population residing within its geographic borders. The Ministry of Health appointed 
boards for the enterprises.33
33 After the change in government from conservative to social-democratic control in 2005, it was 
decided that political representatives appointed by the central government were to serve on the boards 
of the hospital enterprises. 
78 
The reform simultaneously represented both a centralisation and a decentralisation of 
the healthcare system. Politically, central government now took over the 
responsibility for the hospitals, and thereby introduced strong central control at the 
sacrifice of the county councils. Consequently, ownership and the principal 
responsibility for financing and control all rested with the state. Central government’s 
strategic leadership was to be exercised through laws, steering documents, 
instructions, circular letters, general meetings, etc., whereas detailed control was to be 
avoided (cf. Opedal & Stigen, 2002). Parallel with this political centralisation, an 
administrative decentralisation took place, as the RHAs were given relatively 
independent roles in their organising of the specialised healthcare services.34
Financially, the basic grants were to be allocated by the Parliament (the Storting) to 
the respective RHAs, which then were to distribute the resources between the 
hospitals (health enterprises) as they saw fit. This change represented a centralisation 
since the role previously played by the counties was now centralised to the five 
regional units, and because the activity-based share of the funding increased 
somewhat.35
Although there have been some signs of administrative decentralisation, the 
development outlined above by and large represents a centralisation of the Norwegian 
NHS. As observed by Hagen & Kaarbøe (2006) and Magnussen et al. (2006), the 
model changed from being highly decentralised to becoming more semi-centralised,36
and in similar manner, Saltman & Bankauskaite (2006) describe the development as 
“sequential stages of decentralization and now re-centralization” (Saltman & 
Bankauskaite, 2006: 137). Along with the centralisation, integration of private service 
provision into the specialised healthcare system became a crucial element. In 
Odelsting Proposition number 66 (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 2001) out-
sourcing of specialised healthcare services to actors in the private market is 
furthermore emphasised as an important means for the RHAs to pursue their main 
goals (increased efficiency, reduction in waiting time for treatment and reduced 
occupation rates at public hospitals): 
34 In practice, however, the RHAs’ autonomy was repeatedly challenged through interventions by the 
Ministry of Health (e.g., Danielsen et al, 2004; Grund, 2005). 
35 While the activity-based reimbursement share during the pre-reform period (1997–2001) had been 
30–50 per cent, the corresponding figure for the post-reform period was 40–60 per cent. 
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“(...) The RHAs have a responsibility for providing healthcare services of the best 
possible quality, and in accordance with the needs in the population. The RHAs can fulfil 
this task either by providing the services themselves or by contracting out services to 
other healthcare service providers, such as private health care institutions, private 
laboratories and X-ray institutes, and private specialists.” (Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs, 2001, my translation) 
These national guidelines are also stated in concrete terms in the regional steering 
documents, where the equal status of the private and the public providers is further 
emphasised (e.g., Steering document 2004 for the Northern Regional Health 
Authority, 2003). The regional units are actively encouraged to enter public–private 
partnerships to fulfil their provider responsibilities, and the private and public 
healthcare providers are, as far as possible, to be given equal status. Following the 
hospital reform, public–private partnerships and the use of private for-profit hospital 
services therefore mushroomed, and each year since 2002, these hospitals’ share of 
the increases in outpatient and day surgical admissions increased dramatically. From 
2001 to 2004 for-profit hospitals contributed, for instance, to 45 per cent of the total 
increase in day case procedures (The Norwegian Patient Register, 2006). A more 
detailed outline of the Norwegian private healthcare sector is given in Section 2. 
36 The responsibility for primary care still rests with the municipalities, and a centralisation of the entire 
healthcare system can therefore not be said to have taken place. 

